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O'Loughlin: Cognitive Foreclosure

COGNITIVE FORECLOSURE
Peter O’Loughlin*
You’ve been living in a dream world, Neo.1
The Matrix
There are only two industries that call their customers “users”:
illegal drugs and software.2
Edward Tufte
[Y]ou’re manipulating the situation in a way that gives no one a
way out.3
Gilmore Girls
ABSTRACT
Digital markets now fundamentally intertwine with our social and
economic lives. International enforcement actions—the United States
(U.S.) and European Union (E.U.) Google cases in
particular—demonstrate from a behavioral economic perspective how
digital platforms may be beginning to implicate antitrust’s two most
fundamental doctrinal components—conduct and market power—in
nuanced ways. In short, the regulatory and policy landscape
showcases that we may be moving closer towards an antitrust world
whereby firms can manipulate consumers’ psychological
shortcomings to foreclose competition—a new form of nefarious
conduct that might appropriately be termed “cognitive foreclosure.”
Yet as a demand-side market failure, one should be cautious about
categorizing behavioral market failures as antitrust issues. The

* Lecturer in Law and Finance, University of Oxford, Faculty of Law.
1. THE MATRIX (Warner Bros. 1999).
2. Kayla J. Heffernan, Who Treats Their Users Better—Tech or Drug Dealers?, MEDIUM (June 27,
2019),
https://medium.com/@kaylajheffernan/who-treats-their-users-better-tech-or-drug-dealers211f220d8b11 [https://perma.cc/TN5C-MW69].
3. Gilmore Girls: Kill Me Now (The WB television broadcast Oct. 19, 2000).
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behavioral deviation from perfect competition, then, would need to be
“substantial” and “sustainable” if such market failures are to
justifiably attract antitrust scrutiny.
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INTRODUCTION
The behavioral economic (BE) attack on economics’ rational actor
model is now well-established and has voluminously showcased
anomalous deviations from the assumption of perfect rationality.4 In
short, scholars had developed axioms of rationality—like preference
transitivity 5 and preference invariance 6 —and subsequent work
identified phenomena that seemed to contradict these axioms. These
“deviations”—induced by the mental shortcuts (biases and heuristics)
that actors had to take due to their bounded rationality 7—have seen
4. To call the BE literature “vast” is understating it, but some seminal work on deviations from the
more unrealistic assumptions include: Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J.
ECON. 99 (1955); Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q.J. ECON. 643 (1961);
Jack L. Knetsch & J. A. Sinden, Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded: Experimental
Evidence of an Unexpected Disparity in Measures of Value, 99 Q.J. ECON. 507 (1984); and Amos Tversky
& Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974)
(providing a more coherent view of the “anomalies” identified in earlier work). For a more semantic
account of these anomalies, Richard Thaler and colleagues ran an “Anomalies” column in the Journal of
Economic Perspectives. See generally Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler,
Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSPS. 193 (1995);
George Loewenstein & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Intertemporal Choice, 3 J. ECON. PERSPS. 181
(1989); Amos Tversky & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Preference Reversals, 4 J. ECON. PERSPS. 201
(1990); Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Winner’s Curse, 2 J. ECON. PERSPS. 191 (1988).
5. This means that if an actor prefers A to B and B to C, then the actor will also prefer A to C.
6. This means that a choice should remain the same regardless of how the choice (with the same
outcomes) is presented.
7. A key tenet that emerges from the BE literature is that because of individuals’ bounded rationality,
they rely on mental shortcuts that are sometimes prone to error. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and
Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REV. 61, 61 (2000) (“The human brain is
extremely efficient, but it is not a computer. The brain has a limited ability to process information but
must manage a complex array of stimuli. In response to its natural constraints the brain uses shortcuts that
allow it to perform well under most circumstances. Reliance on these shortcuts, however, leaves people
susceptible to all manner of illusions: visual, mnemonic, and judgmental.” (footnote omitted)); see also
Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral
Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 70–71 (2002) (“Research from psychology
and behavioral economics studies reveals that human judgment and decision[-]making necessarily rely on
imperfect psychological mechanisms that cause systematic departures from rationality.” (emphasis
added)); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Reality of Cognitive Illusions, 103 PSYCH. REV. 582,
582 (1996) (“These heuristics . . . are often useful but they sometimes lead to characteristic errors or
biases . . . .”); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 4, at 1124 (“[P]eople rely on a limited number of heuristic
principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler
judgmental operations.”); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477 (1998) (“Bounded rationality . . . refers to the obvious
fact that human cognitive abilities are not infinite. . . . [P]eople sometimes respond rationally to their own
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empirical validation, along with important theoretical (and practical)
implications across diverse fields such as health, environment, and
education.8 BE now even has its own card game. 9 In fact, this evolving
concept of “irrationality,” which seems to continually encompass a
never-ending list of biases and heuristics, 10 has expanded so much that
the “dream world” which Morpheus described to Neo in The Matrix is
perhaps becoming a pessimistically accurate description of human
decision-making.11
Perhaps the most potent and obvious application for BE was the
legal system given the significant impact of Law and Economics,
which revolutionized legal thinking across an impressive array of legal
topics. 12 Thus arrived the field of Behavioral Law and Economics
(BLE), which leveraged the biases and heuristics identified by earlier
work and challenged the Law and Economics’ assumption of “strict”13
rationality.14 It was only natural, then, that such behavioral phenomena
cognitive limitations . . . [b]ut even with these remedies, and in some cases because of these remedies,
human behavior differs in systematic ways from that predicted by the standard economic model of
unbounded rationality. Even when the use of mental shortcuts is rational, it can produce predictable
mistakes.”).
8. Jolls et al., supra note 7, at 1483 (“Careful empirical study . . . shows that the Coase theorem is
not a tautology; indeed, it can lead to inaccurate predictions.” (citing Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch
& Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL.
ECON. 1325, 1329–42 (1990))). For some potential practical applications, see generally RICHARD H.
THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND
HAPPINESS (2008), where the authors discuss how people make decisions regarding health, education, and
investments.
9. DAN ARIELY’S IRRATIONAL GAME, https://irrationalgame.com/ [https://perma.cc/P29W-VF8G].
10. See John Manoogian III & Buster Benson, Cognitive Bias Codex, VISUAL CAPITALIST,
https://www.visualcapitalist.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/cognitive-bias-infographic.html
[https://perma.cc/2NS4-VEG5] (offering an illuminating and helpful depiction of the apparently 188
“cognitive quirks” we suffer from).
11. THE MATRIX, supra note 1.
12. See Oliver E. Williamson, Why Law, Economics, and Organization?, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI.
369, 369 (2005) (“Occasional dissents notwithstanding, it is widely conceded that law and economics is
a success story.”). See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (9th ed. 2014)
(discussing law and economics across multiple legal disciplines).
13. Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, The Empty Promise of Behavioral Antitrust, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 1009, 1024 (2014) (“To explain observed departures from strict rationality, behavioral economists
appeal to a wide variety of psychological biases . . . .”).
14. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1085 (2000). Note early BLE
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would eventually breathe their way into antitrust debate and challenge,
among other things, the insights of the Chicago School and its strong
belief in efficient markets that self-correct.15 Indeed, if efficient entry
and efficient switching were now cast in doubt because of BE findings,
we would find ourselves believing less in a market’s self-correcting
capacities and preferring more antitrust enforcement.16
scholarship displayed much optimism in the field’s potential to penetrate legal policy and legal analysis.
Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Law and Economics: A Progress Report, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 115, 115
(1999) (describing how the “outpouring” of BLE scholarship became a “flood”); see Thomas S. Ulen, The
Growing Pains of Behavioral Law and Economics, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1763 (1998) (“Behavioral
law and economics is exciting, and it is only just beginning. A new theory of human decision making is
in the offing, one that captures the best of rational choice theory and supplements it with a subtle view of
how and why and when humans make mistakes in judgment.”); Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T
Man, and the Future of Behavioral Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1663, 1671–77 (2003)
(surveying traditional neoclassical law and economics analyses and concluding “[t]his survey could
continue for many pages, but these examples should serve to indicate that it is at least arguable that K-T
Man provides a more descriptive model of human behavior upon which to base legal policy prescriptions
than does Chicago Man”). This optimism led to a waterfall of BLE scholarship. The following is just a
small sample of the BLE literature. See generally Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract
Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998) (discussing status quo bias in contract default rules);
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113 (1996)
(noting that litigation can cause people to make different decisions depending on circumstances); Jeffrey
J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998)
(arguing that the law reflects a hindsight bias); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1175 (1997) (analyzing behavioral research and how it affects the law).
15. Andreas Heinemann, Behavioural Antitrust, in EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON BEHAVIOURAL LAW
AND ECONOMICS 211, 211–12 (Klaus Mathis ed., 2015) (“[Chicago’s approach] is modelled on the basic
assumption that market participants act perfectly rational and maximise their own profit or utility.”
(emphasis added)).
16. There is a functional relationship between a (dis)belief in a market’s self-correcting capacities and
the quantity of antitrust enforcement scope. Less belief reveals a preference for more antitrust enforcement
and vice-versa. This variance in (dis)beliefs and concomitant preferences for more or less antitrust
enforcement can be seen across several antitrust schools of thought. For instance, the Harvard School was
more “intervention-minded.” William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law
for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 30. In
contrast, Chicago preferred less intervention given its greater faith in the disciplining capacities of
markets. See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 932
(1979) (describing Chicago as rejecting an “expansive notion of ‘barriers to entry’”). The latter also
contrasts with Post-Chicago. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique,
2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 257, 278–79 (“The principal difference between Chicago and
post-Chicago . . . is that under a more complex set of assumptions about how a market works,
anticompetitive outcomes seem more plausible.”). For BE constraints on perfect market self-correction,
see Matthew Bennett, John Fingleton, Amelia Fletcher, Liz Hurley & David Ruck, What Does Behavioral
Economics Mean for Competition Policy?, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Spring 2010, at 111, noting:
Supply-side biases may also have implications for the way entry is assessed in
antitrust cases. There is significant empirical evidence to show that firms are often
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BE clearly has significance for antitrust, though we are only now
beginning to see some inroads into enforcement as the Google cases
demonstrate—where the theories of harm are premised on consumers’
behavioral shortcomings.17 Indeed, at the time of writing, the United
States Department of Justice (U.S. DOJ) has instigated a formal
complaint against Google, part of which is grounded on a behavioral
theory of “sticky” consumers—in other words, consumers who do not
change default applications on their mobile devices.18 As Devlin and
Jacobs explain after emphasizing the importance of the “substitution
effect” for antitrust19: “What does the behavioral literature say about
this, perhaps the most critical question in antitrust law? It offers a
litany of biases, some of which might add to, while others of which
might detract from, the market’s tendency to self-correct through
prompt consumer substitution.”20
Despite the significance of substitution for antitrust (and the
potential BE consequences for this concept), much of the scholarly and
regulatory literature has yet to systematically examine the BE
overconfident when it comes to predicting their success on a market. A very large
percentage of firms that enter into a new market fail within a short period of time.
Does this mean that it is right to be more cautious than we would otherwise be when
considering the possibility of entry as a countervailing force for the creation or
abuse of market power?
Id. at 125 (footnote omitted). Cf. Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market
Discipline, and Legal Policy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 482, 486–87 (2002) (arguing that behavioral
shortcomings like “overoptimism” may, in fact, spur successful “excess” entry because “[t]hese entrants,
even when they fail and more so when they succeed, facilitate economic growth and expand the range of
consumer choice. Equally important, they make a significant long-term contribution to the disciplining of
incumbent firms.”).
17. See infra Part I.
18. Complaint at 3, United States v. Google LLC, No. 20-cv-03010 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 20, 2020) (“For
a general search engine, by far the most effective means of distribution is to be the preset default general
search engine for mobile and computer search access points. Even where users can change the default,
they rarely do. This leaves the preset default general search engine with de facto exclusivity. As Google
itself has recognized, this is particularly true on mobile devices, where defaults are especially sticky.”
(emphasis added)).
19. Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 13, at 1025–26. Devlin and Jacobs describe it in this way:
The proposition that consumers will substitute away from more expensive products
to lower-priced, substitute goods lies at the heart of antitrust policy. . . . The degree
to which this proposition holds true in actual markets dictates the degree of
appropriate intervention through the competition laws. . . .
Substitution matters enormously to antitrust.
Id.
20. Id. at 1027 (emphasis added).
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implications for antitrust enforcement’s two most fundamental
doctrinal components: conduct and market power. 21 This seems a
strange omission not only because of the ascending inclination to
categorize behavioral shortcomings as an emerging form of market
failure 22 but also, more pertinently, because a unilateral antitrust
infringement depends on a firm engaging in anticompetitive conduct23
21. Of course, this is not to say that scholars have not somewhat acknowledged BE’s implications in
these respects and have even provided some illustrations. Their discussions and analyses are limited,
however. See, e.g., Maurice E. Stucke, The Implications of Behavioral Antitrust 2–7 (Univ. of Tenn.
Knoxville Coll. of L., Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 192, 2012) [hereinafter
Stucke,
Implications
of
Behavioral
Antitrust],
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2109713 [https://perma.cc/R86S-W9DH] (using
Microsoft Corp. v. Commission as an example to demonstrate the power of defaults and, as such, the status
quo bias); Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust and Monopolization, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON.
545, 560–67 (2012) [hereinafter Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust and Monopolization] (using Microsoft as an
example to illustrate the status quo bias implications for the foreclosure effect in tying analysis). The
omission is more severe as it relates to the BE deviation from perfection and hence its capacity to generate
antitrust market power. Thomas C. Arthur, The Costly Quest for Perfect Competition: Kodak and
Nonstructural Market Power, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 25–26 (1994). This point has not yet even been
identified in the literature.
22. See, e.g., Jason F. Shogren & Laura O. Taylor, On Behavioral-Environmental Economics, 2 REV.
ENV’T ECON. & POL’Y 26, 27 (2008); Jason F. Shogren, WAEA Keynote Address Behavioral
Environmental Economics: Money Pumps & Nudges, 37 J. AGRIC. & RES. ECON. 349, 350 (2012); Oren
Bar-Gill, Exchange, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 749, 801
(2008) (using the term “behavioral market failure”); Cass R. Sunstein, The Storrs Lectures: Behavioral
Economics and Paternalism, 122 YALE L.J. 1826, 1826 (2013) (referring to behavioral mistakes as
“behavioral market failures”); Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its
Sails and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1601 (2014) (using the term “behavioral market failures”).
23. In the EU, the conduct must be outside the scope of “competi[tion] on the merits.” Guidance on
the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive
Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, 2009 O.J. (C 45) 7, ¶ 6 [hereinafter Exclusionary
Conduct Enforcement Guidance] (“The emphasis of the Commission’s enforcement activity in relation to
exclusionary conduct is on safeguarding the competitive process in the internal market and ensuring that
undertakings which hold a dominant position do not exclude their competitors by other means than
competing on the merits of the products or services they provide.” (emphasis added)); Case T-201/04
Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶ 1070 (“It must be borne in mind . . . that [Article 102
TFEU] is intended to prohibit a dominant undertaking from strengthening its position by recourse to
means other than those based on competition on the merits.” (citations omitted)); Case C-280/08 P
Deutsche Telekom AG v. Comm’n, 2010 E.C.R. I-9555, ¶ 177 (holding that Article 102 TFEU prohibits
a dominant firm from strengthening its dominant position “by using methods other than those which come
within the scope of competition on the merits”); Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige
AB, 2011 E.C.R. I-527, ¶ 43 (explaining that excluding competitors through distortive competitive
practices would not be competition “solely on the respective merits of the undertakings concerned”); Case
C-457/10 P AstraZeneca AB v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:C:2012:770, ¶ 75 (Dec. 6, 2012) (“[Article 102
TFEU] prohibits a dominant undertaking from eliminating a competitor and thereby strengthening its
position by using methods other than those which come within the scope of competition on the merits.”
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and possessing “antitrust” market power (which, as we will see, means
“substantial” and “sustainable” market power). Consequently, there is
a need to comprehensively assess (1) the extent to which firms can
generate demand-side foreclosure through manipulation of consumer
biases and (2) whether behavioral shortcomings as a deviation from
perfection are “substantial” and “sustainable” enough to constitute
“antitrust” market power. To the extent that the latter deviation
satisfies these criteria, it will serve to illuminate when BE may
transform from a consumer protection issue—an area of law regulating
more de minimis market failures—into an antitrust issue.24
These
two
parameters—manipulative
conduct
and
irrationally-generated market power—are both emerging as significant
antitrust concerns in the digital sphere and relevant considerations of
competition appraisal. The recent and long-awaited Google LLC &
Alphabet, Inc. v. Commission (Google Shopping) 25 judgment
vindicates these concerns in significant respects—particularly the
emerging phenomenon of manipulative self-preferencing and the
pernicious foreclosure of rivals. Indeed, recent digital market
regulatory and policy investigations and reports are now starting to
acknowledge the potential power of digital platforms to manipulate
consumers’ behavioral biases and foreclose competition. 26
(citations omitted)); Case C-413/14 P Intel Corp. v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:C:2017:632, ¶ 136 (Sept. 19 &
Oct. 24, 2017) (“Article 102 TFEU prohibits . . . methods other than those that are part of competition on
the merits.”). For the U.S., see Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
U.S. 398, 407 (2004) (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966)), where the
Supreme Court describes “willful” conduct as necessary in addition to monopoly power to find liability
under section two of the Sherman Act; and id., where the Court finds that “[t]o safeguard the incentive to
innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an
element of anticompetitive conduct.”
24. See infra Part IV.
25. See generally Case T-612/17 Google LLC & Alphabet, Inc. v. Comm’n (Google Shopping),
ECLI:EU:T:2021:763 (Nov. 10, 2021), appeal filed, Case C-48/22 P (Jan. 20, 2022).
26. George J. Stigler Ctr. for the Study of the Econ. & the State, Univ. of Chi. Booth Sch. of Bus.,
Market Structure and Antitrust Subcommittee: Report, in STIGLER COMMITTEE ON DIGITAL PLATFORMS:
FINAL REPORT 23, 87 (2019) [hereinafter Stigler Antitrust Subcommittee Report],
https://www.chicagobooth.edu/-/media/research/stigler/pdfs/digital-platforms—-committee-report—stigler-center.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NZZ-V4LJ] (describing how foreclosure can manifest when
platforms exploit consumers’ behavioral biases “to keep consumers attached to their platforms and make
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Additionally, consumers can (unknowingly) contribute to creating
market power themselves by failing to take actions “that may look like
poor decisions if those consumers like to choose among options and
experience competition” in digital markets. 27 In any case, the
revelation that digital platforms possess continuous and ubiquitous
insight into our daily lives and may shape our opinions and
decision-making processes through Big Data analytics28 highlights on
switching to alternatives more difficult.” These tactics generally make consumers less receptive to
competitive alternatives—they lower contestability—and thus raise entry barriers.” (emphasis added));
SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. & ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, INVESTIGATION OF
COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS: MAJORITY STAFF REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 53 (2020)
[hereinafter
INVESTIGATION
OF
COMPETITION
IN
DIGITAL
MARKETS],
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/competition_in_digital_markets.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9Y2ZQWJ] (describing how, at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, “Google attempted to manipulate users
into using its Google Meet videoconferencing tool instead of upstart competitor Zoom.”); see also DIGIT.
COMPETITION EXPERT PANEL, UNLOCKING DIGITAL COMPETITION: REPORT OF THE DIGITAL
COMPETITION
EXPERT
PANEL
32
(2019)
(U.K.),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/78554
7/unlocking_digital_competition_furman_review_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/H962-RSL5] (“Digital
markets also have features that heighten concentration, including . . . limitations to switching and
multi-homing including behavioural factors . . . .”).
27. Stigler Antitrust Subcommittee Report, supra note 26, at 41 (“Market power is, ironically,
generated by the very consumers who are harmed by it. Consumers do not replace the default apps on
their phones, do not scroll down to see more results, agree to settings chosen by the service. . . . Consumers
make these ‘mistakes’ because of inherent behavioral biases such as discounting the future too much and
being too optimistic.”); see also JACQUES CRÉMER, YVES-ALEXANDRE DE MONTJOYE, & HEIKE
SCHWEITZER, EUR. COMM’N, COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE DIGITAL ERA: FINAL REPORT 4 (2019),
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/kd0419345enn.pdf [https://perma.cc/7G9H-7JQR]
(“The assessment of market power has to be case-specific, and it must take into account insights drawn
from behavioural economics about the strength of consumers’ biases towards default options and
short-term gratification.” (emphasis added)); AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM’N,
DIGITAL
PLATFORMS
INQUIRY:
FINAL
REPORT
110
(2019),
https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Digital%20platforms%20inquiry%20-%20final%20report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/57AP-DLXQ] (“One of the ACCC’s key findings [in its Market Power chapter] is that
Google has substantial market power in the supply of search services and in the supply of search
advertising. The ACCC identified customer inertia as a barrier to expansion and considered that customer
inertia is reinforced by a default bias that exists with Google Search being the default search engine on a
number of internet browsers, and Google Chrome being the default internet browser on a number of
operating systems.” (emphasis added)); AUTORITEIT CONSUMENT & MARKT [NETH. AUTH. FOR
CONSUMERS & MKTS.], BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS AND COMPETITION POLICY 12 (2013),
https://www.acm.nl/sites/default/files/old_publication/publicaties/11586_acm-behavioural-economicscompetition-policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GQV-H7MC] (describing how the imperfect rationality of a
consumer with respect to a product’s entire cost (including add-ons) may confer on suppliers “pockets of
market power”).
28. For an illuminating Netflix documentary, see Devika Girish, ‘The Social Dilemma’ Review:
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its own accord that, at least in the context of digital platform markets,
we may be moving closer towards a new, more pernicious form of
antitrust foreclosure that might appropriately be termed “cognitive
foreclosure.”
Against this backdrop, this Article unfolds as follows. Part I
examines the development of foreclosure cases and illustrates how the
advent of technology has led to a new wave of more pernicious
foreclosure capacities—that is, the two-pronged attack of BE and
technology in cognitively foreclosing competition. Part II illuminates
a consumer’s heightened propensity to be manipulated in the digital
platform world due to heuristic responses “predominat[ing]”29 in this
environment coupled with amplified abilities and incentives of digital
platforms to manipulate consumers’ cognitive shortcomings. Part II
thus advances existing literature, which acknowledged, for the most
part, only the potential for manipulation but refrained from assessing
the potential’s seriousness for competition law purposes. Part III
demonstrates specific ways a dominant digital platform could
cognitively foreclose competition and thereby strengthen its market
power by “shap[ing] demand” 30 through behaviorally manipulative
Unplug and Run, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/09/movies/the-socialdilemma-review.html [https://perma.cc/9RWK-JYB9], where the article notes that “conscientious
defectors from [social media companies] explain that the perniciousness of [these companies] is a feature,
not a bug.”
29. Eldar Shafir & Robyn A. LeBoeuf, Rationality, 53 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 491, 500 (2002) (describing
literature that differentiates between the “dual-process” theory of thinking “all of which posit at least two
basic modes of processing—one in which heuristic responses predominate and another in which more
deliberate strategies take over”); see also Paul Slovic, Melissa Finucane, Ellen Peters & Donald G.
MacGregor, Rational Actors or Rational Fools: Implications of the Affect Heuristic for Behavioral
Economics, 31 J. SOCIO-ECON. 329, 329 (2002) (describing “two fundamental modes of thinking”—one
is “[t]he experiential mode, [which] is intuitive, automatic, natural, and based upon images to which
positive and affective feelings have been attached through learning and experience. The other mode is
analytical, deliberative, and reason based.”).
30. Margherita Colangelo & Mariateresa Maggiolino, Manipulation of Information as Antitrust
Infringement, 26 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63, 64 (2019); see also id. at 90 (“[T]here is room to believe that what
renders . . . information unduly persuasive is the supposed ability of enterprises to recognize the cognitive
limits of each and every individual and thereby exploit it.”); id. at 89 (contending that “unduly persuasive
information . . . seems to be at the crux of the data economy” and that this “category of information”
derives its persuasiveness from the “ability of firms to profile consumers such that their preferences are
known and their cognitive limits exploited” (emphasis added)). Additionally, when the demand-side—the
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conduct. Part IV positions BE as a demand-side market failure that
potentially blurs the line between antitrust law and consumer
protection law. Indeed, even though powerfully pernicious ways to
cognitively foreclose competition exist, a prerequisite for antitrust
enforcement is “antitrust” market power. The BE deviation from
perfect competition, then, will need to be “substantial” and
“sustainable” to warrant antitrust scrutiny. Digital platform markets
are proffered as contexts in which BE could satisfy these criteria and,
hence, present as environments where the demand-side market failure
of cognitive foreclosure deserves to be taken seriously by antitrust
enforcement policy.
I. “ANTITRUST FORECLOSURE” RETROSPECTIVE–A PERNICIOUS
EVOLUTION
That exclusionary practices generate controversy in antitrust
enforcement is not new; indeed, “antitrust foreclosure” has always
been considered an amorphous concept because of the difficulty in
distinguishing practices that exclude rivals due to genuine efficiency
from practices that artificially exclude. 31 The question has even been
source of behavioral market failures—has been raised as an antitrust issue, antitrust analysis has usually
been limited to scenarios of an already-dominant firm that is seeking to solidify its market power. See,
e.g., Max Huffman, Bridging the Divide? Theories for Integrating Competition Law and Consumer
Protection, 6 EUR. COMPETITION J. 7, 12–13 (2010) (describing how “monopoly maintenance through
deception is realistic” and should “therefore offer a basis for an abuse of dominance liability” (emphasis
added)); Michael A. Carrier & Rebecca Tushnet, An Antitrust Framework for False Advertising, 106
IOWA L. REV. 1841, 1851 (2021) (“By engaging in deception that resembles exclusionary conduct, a
company—in particular, a monopolist—could entrench its position in the market.” (emphasis added));
Maurice E. Stucke, How Do (and Should) Competition Authorities Treat a Dominant Firm’s Deception?,
63 SMU L. REV. 1069 (2010) (limiting the analysis to a monopolist’s use of deception to significantly
maintain its market power).
31. Richard A. Posner, Exclusionary Practices and the Antitrust Laws, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 506, 534
(1974) (“The most difficult question raised by the exclusionary practices is not whether such practices
exist, which is the focus of the debate between the Chicago School and its opponents, but whether they
are sufficiently dangerous to justify extremely costly enforcement efforts, costly because of the difficulty
of distinguishing between exclusionary practices and practices that promote efficiency.”); ROBERT H.
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 137 (The Free Press 1993) (1978)
(“The problem is to know what exclusion is improper.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Chicago School and
Exclusionary Conduct, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 439, 442 (2008) (“The big problem with the law of

Published by Reading Room, 2022

13

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 4 [2022], Art. 9

1110

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:4

asked whether “exclusionary” antitrust exists at all.32 For instance, the
lack of a clear dividing line that differentiates exclusion with
redeeming value from exclusion with little or no redeeming value, as
evidenced by case law and regulatory guidance, reflects this
elusiveness.33 For example, different criteria and conditions apply to
different forms of foreclosure—like price-based exclusionary
conduct 34 and exclusive dealing (which can include rebates) 35—and
firms can raise different kinds of objective necessity and efficiency
defenses.36
Thus, if antitrust foreclosure has always been an elusive concept,
this malleability will perhaps not be helped by two parallel but
now-converging exclusionary phenomena: digital technologies and
online platforms that are equipped to add only more obscurity given
the potential for more subtle exclusionary capabilities 37 and behavioral
biases and heuristics that can be manipulated 38 to ensure “sticky”
consumers and induce a more nuanced form of demand-side
foreclosure.39 As Stylianou acknowledges, “As technology changes[]
and enables additional and different designs, so does the competitive

exclusionary practices is that all competitors [necessarily] seek to undercut and exclude rivals.”); see also
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 193 (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW]
(introducing the law of “exclusionary practices” and commenting that “[a] serious problem” generated by
these practices “is that a practice may be at once exclusionary and efficient”); Frank H. Easterbrook, On
Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 972, 972 (1986) (“Competitive and
exclusionary conduct look alike.”).
32. Eleanor M. Fox, What Is Harm to Competition? Exclusionary Practices and Anticompetitive
Effect, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 371, 371–72 (2002) (asking whether antitrust addresses “more” than
straightforward exploitative practices—in other words, “is there an exclusionary-practices
violation . . . ?”).
33. See Exclusionary Conduct Enforcement Guidance, supra note 23, ¶¶ 19-23.
34. Id. ¶¶ 23-27.
35. Id. ¶¶ 32-46.
36. Id. ¶¶ 28-31.
37. Gregory Day & Abbey Stemler, Are Dark Patterns Anticompetitive?, 72 ALA. L. REV. 1, 15 (2020)
(“Problems arise when technology—rather than catering to a user’s stated or unstated preferences—causes
users to engage in behaviors against their best interests. The manipulation is indeed subtle.” (emphasis
added)); see also infra Part IV.
38. Max Huffman, Marrying Neo-Chicago with Behavioral Antitrust, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 105, 129–30
(2012).
39. Complaint at 3, United States v. Google LLC, No. 20-cv-03010 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 20, 2020).
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fabric of the industry. . . . [T]echnology may [therefore] create new
methods of exclusion in digital markets . . . .”40
As the following Sections delineate, “[these] phenomenon[a]
reflect[] an evolution of exclusion cases from straightforward
exclusion, through unilateral refusals to deal . . . to less transparent
techniques.” 41 The following Section thus seeks to trace the
development of antitrust foreclosure as one evolving from transparent,
to less transparent, to obscure. As we will see, technology, fused with
BE, may be providing a powerful combination for an emerging, more
pernicious antitrust foreclosure.
A. Transparent Exclusion
Some of the early refusal-to-deal and -license cases (refusal cases)
demonstrated straightforward forms of foreclosure, where evidence
adduced to allege foreclosure was readily available and illuminating.
In Istituto Chemoterapico Italiano v. Commission, for instance,
Commercial Solvents ceased to supply an upstream input,
aminobutanol, to a downstream drugs manufacturer, Laboratorio
Chemico [sic] Farmaceutico Giorgio Zoja SpA [Pharmaceutical
Chemical Laboratory Giorgio Zoja S.p.A] (Zoja), in the latter’s
production of a tuberculosis drug, ethambutol. 42 The European
Commission held this to be abusively anticompetitive.43 This was a
clear-cut case of exclusion because if the aminobutanol supplies
stopped—and documentary evidence revealed that Commercial
Solvents had indeed ceased providing the supplies 44—Zoja would be
forced to exit the downstream market. 45 Zoja’s exit—that is, the
40. Konstantinos Stylianou, Exclusion in Digital Markets, 24 MICH. TELECOMMS. & TECH. L. REV.
181, 184, 187 (2018). Ezrachi and Stucke have also made similar comments in the context of collusive
behavior. See generally Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke, Artificial Intelligence & Collusion: When
Computers Inhibit Competition, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1775.
41. Mark R. Patterson, Algorithmic Opacity and Exclusion in Antitrust Law, 5 RIVISTA ITALIANA DI
ANTITRUST [ITALIAN ANTITRUST REV.], no. 1, 2018, at 23, 23.
42. Joined Cases 6 & 7/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA v. Comm’n, 1974 E.C.R. 223, 226.
43. Id. at 233 (“The Commission states that in the present case the buyer (Zoja) depends on the
availability of . . . aminobutanol . . . . [and cutting off its supply] would inevitably result in Zoja’s
disappearing from the market.” (emphasis omitted)).
44. Id. ¶ 24, at 250.
45. Id. ¶ 25, at 250–51.
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foreclosure effect of the conduct—was also certain because of
Commercial Solvents’ dominance in the raw material market (Zoja had
nowhere else to go).46
Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission is another refusal case and
further illustrates the transparent nature of such an abuse.47 Television
stations possessed television program information that Magill TV
Guide Ltd. (Magill) wanted access to, so it could produce a fully
comprehensive weekly television guide. 48 The television stations
refused to license the information to Magill. 49 The court held this was
anticompetitively harming consumers because such conduct was
preventing “the appearance of a new product—a comprehensive
weekly guide to television programs, which the appellants did not offer
and for which there was a potential consumer demand.” 50 Both the
anticompetitive conduct and the foreclosure effect were easily
identifiable. For instance, the television stations had actively obtained
an injunction to prevent the publication of such a guide51 and grounded
their refusal on intellectual property arguments. 52 Further, Magill was
demonstrably foreclosed from the market due to the television program
information being clearly indispensable and unobtainable anywhere
else.53 As the Court of Justice of the European Union explained, “[T]he
appellants . . . were, by force of circumstance, the only sources of the
basic information on programme scheduling which is the
indispensable raw material for compiling a weekly television
guide . . . .”54
Both seminal refusal cases exemplify the ease with which such an
abuse can be identified. Indeed, the demonstrable nature of the conduct
and the foreclosure effect seem to be a theme running across
46. Id. ¶ 18, at 249 (“[T]hat CSC had a dominant position on the world market in the production and
sale of the raw material in question has been sufficiently established in law.”).
47. Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) v. Comm’n, 1995 E.C.R.
I-743.
48. Id. ¶ 10.
49. Id. ¶ 11.
50. Id. ¶ 54.
51. Id. ¶ 10.
52. Id. ¶ 51.
53. See RTE, 1995 E.C.R. I-743, ¶ 53.
54. Id. (emphasis added).
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brick-and-mortar refusal cases—the more recent Baltic Rail case 55
perhaps being the most pointed example where cutting away nineteen
kilometers of railroad track was described as “the most straightforward
abuse case ever.”56 Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States57 and Aspen
Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. 58 are equally illuminating:
respectively, the refusal to transmit electricity through power lines to
potential rivals and a ski slope operator’s refusal to continue to make
a ski slope available with a rival ski slope operator on favorable terms
both showcase obvious forms of foreclosure. 59 As Patterson notes:
“[When] a dominant firm refused to deal with a competitor . . . there
was no difficulty in presenting evidence of the conduct at issue.”60

55. Commission Decision C(2017) 6544 Case AT.39813 – Baltic Rail (Oct. 2, 2017),
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39813/39813_1554_3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZC6R-WBUF], aff’d sub nom. Case T-814/17 Lietuvos geležinkeliai AB v. Comm’n,
ECLI:EU:T:2020:545 (Nov. 18, 2020), appeal filed, Case C-42/21 P (Jan. 27, 2021).
56. Pablo Ibáñez Colomo & Alfonso Lamadrid, Lithuanian Railways: The Most Straightforward
Abuse
Case
Ever?,
CHILLIN’COMPETITION
(Oct.
5,
2017,
5:10
PM),
https://chillingcompetition.com/2017/10/05/lithuanian-railways-the-most-straightforward-abuse-caseever/ [https://perma.cc/2X7S-XD6G]; see also Pablo Ibáñez Colomo & Alfonso Lamadrid, GC Judgment
in Case T-814/17, Lithuanian Railways – Part I: Object and Indispensability, CHILLIN’COMPETITION
(Dec. 1, 2020, 12:34 PM), https://chillingcompetition.com/2020/12/01/gc-judgment-in-caset%E2%80%91814-17-lithuanian-railways-part-i-object-and-indispensability/ [https://perma.cc/M7WZSYY3] (“[I]t is perhaps the most blatant abuse that the European Commission has ever considered.”).
57. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
58. 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
59. In Aspen Skiing for instance, evidence that was particularly illustrative was Aspen Skiing
Company’s (Ski Co.) national advertising campaign that implied only three (not four) mountains were
available at the ski resort coupled with the fact that the four-mountain ski ticket was replaced with a
three-mountain ticket. Id. at 593. Further, the evidence demonstrated that consumers were being adversely
affected by the removal of the four-mountain ticket because the record showed they preferred four
mountains to three. Id. at 606. The foreclosure effect on Aspen Highlands Skiing Corporation (Highlands)
was also readily apparent. Id. at 607–08 (“The adverse impact of Ski Co.’s pattern of conduct on Highlands
is not disputed in this Court. Expert testimony described the extent of its pecuniary injury. The evidence
concerning its attempt to develop a substitute product either by buying Ski Co.’s daily tickets in bulk, or
by marketing its own Adventure Pack, demonstrates that it tried to protect itself from the loss of its share
of the patrons of the all-Aspen ticket. The development of a new distribution system for providing the
experience that skiers had learned to expect in Aspen proved to be prohibitively expensive. As a result,
Highlands’ share of the relevant market steadily declined after the [four]-area ticket was terminated.”) In
Otter Tail, prospective municipal electricity suppliers were foreclosed from entering various municipal
markets because they needed access to electricity transmission lines. 410 U.S. at 370–71. Otter Tail owned
the only transmission lines available and refused to grant access. Id.
60. Patterson, supra note 41.
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B. Less Transparent Exclusion
The “means of exclusion [arguably] became subtler . . . with rebate
structures.”61 One reason foreclosure through rebates may be viewed
as less transparent than the refusal cases is that the foreclosure effect
manifests from the demand side—that is, consumers may feel induced
by the rebate to continue to purchase their supplies from the
discounting firm and therefore become locked in. 62 Note the extra
dependent step involved (consumers falling foul to, rather than
countenancing, the conduct’s intended effect) in demand-side
foreclosure as compared to orthodox supply-side output restrictions.63
The anticompetitive harm, therefore, can happen “only after an
intervening step.” 64 The aforementioned degree of pressure from
rebates on the consumer is largest for exclusivity rebates because the
consumer must purchase from the discounting firm to receive the
discount. What will become clear, however, is that firms have engaged
more structurally subtle techniques for inducing the consumer to
continually purchase and artificially restrict its supplier choice.
NV Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin v. Commission65 is a
prime example of a more covert rebate scheme. The Commission held
that Michelin abused its dominant position in the market for
heavy-duty vehicle replacement tires because it offered rebates to tire
dealers if the dealers reached specific sales targets. 66 More obscurely,
the discount system involved an annual variable discount:
[A] proportion of which was paid initially every month and
then every four months in the form of an advance of the
annual discount. The percentage of this variable annual
discount was determined according to the dealer’s turnover
61. Id.
62. Gianluca Faella, The Antitrust Assessment of Loyalty Discounts and Rebates, 4 J. COMPETITION
L. & ECON. 375, 377 (2008) (“When applied retroactively to the entire amount of purchases realized by a
customer during a certain reference period (so-called all-units discounts), loyalty discounts may determine
a kind of lock-in effect, in that they generate switching costs for buyers.”).
63. See id.
64. Note, Deception as an Antitrust Violation, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1235, 1255 (2012).
65. Case 322/81, NV Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin v. Comm’n, 1983 E.C.R. 3461.
66. Id. ¶ 67.
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in Michelin heavy-vehicle, van and car t[i]res in the previous
year, with no distinction of category, on the basis of a
progressive discount scale [but which was ultimately
abandoned]. The advance on the annual discount was less,
generally by 4% but sometimes by more, than the percentage
laid down by the scale.67
As if the substance of this scheme could not be any less transparent,
the scheme could only be successfully triggered if “the dealer achieved
during the year in question a sales target which was expressed as a
number of heavy-vehicle tires sold and was fixed or agreed at the
beginning of the year.”68 Schemes remaining unpublished by Michelin
added to this obscurity.69 There was “no written confirmation” after
the discussions about targets at each year’s beginning, and
documentary evidence apparently amounted to written notes “taken or
exchanged during [the discussions].”70
The court’s reasoning about the foreclosure effect, which
manifested from the demand-side, is also telling with respect to exactly
how the exclusion of rivals was being induced in an obscure fashion.
Specifically, the court held that discount systems which grant
discounts “according to the quantities sold during a relatively long
reference period [have] the inherent effect, at the end of that period, of
increasing pressure on the buyer to reach the purchase figure needed
to obtain the discount or to avoid suffering the expected loss for the
entire period.”71 The court held that in this case, even small variations
in the discount rate had the capacity to affect the entire year’s profit
which could potentially “put dealers under appreciable pressure.” 72
Indeed, it is perhaps also telling that some scholars have relied on
BE—a much more complex account of human behavior—to explain
this pressure of reaching a future goal and deriving benefits for a

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
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preceding reference period to just illuminate why it is that a foreclosure
effect may result.73 In particular, “goals shift reference points upwards
so that foregoing the rebate is perceived as a loss,” making consumers
“more reluctant to switch to a different supplier due to loss aversion.”74
The European Commission referred to this as the suction effect—a
further attestation of the nuanced and more covert way rebates may
generate foreclosure.75
Michelin is not a stand-alone example of complicated rebate
schemes with subtle but powerful foreclosure tendencies. Other cases
illustrate the sophisticated and intricate nature of these kinds of
exclusionary behaviors and the delicate way in which foreclosure
manifests, particularly in the context of bundled discounts where the
discount is aggregated across the conditional purchase of various
products 76 and contestable and incontestable demand become
intermingled. Hovenkamp has described such practices and their
competitive assessments as “complex,”77 particularly because as both
bundled goods and bundled quantities change, “then the bundle’s
73. Alexander Morell, Andreas Glöckner & Emanuel V. Towfigh, Sticky Rebates: Loyalty Rebates
Impede Rational Switching of Consumers, 11 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 431, 431 (2015) (“[Cumulative
Prospect Theory] predicts that loyalty rebates could harm consumers by impeding rational switching from
an incumbent to an outside option (for example, a market entrant).”).
74. Id. at 432. On the concept of loss aversion, see infra Part III.A.1.a.
75. DG Competition Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary
Abuses, ¶ 153
(2005),
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D8M5-D489] (“The strength of the inducement to purchase more from the dominant
supplier, i.e.[,] the loyalty enhancing effect, will depend on amongst other things . . . on the level of the
threshold. The higher the rebate percentage and the higher the amount that needs to be purchased before
the rebate kicks in, the stronger the inducement just below the threshold. The fact that exceeding the
threshold will not only reduce the price for all purchases above the threshold, but also for all previous
purchases during the reference period, will create a so-called ‘suction’ effect.” (footnote omitted)).
Seminal cases have highlighted this “suction” effect. Case T-219/99 Brit. Airways plc v. Comm’n, 2003
E.C.R. II-5917, ¶¶ 272-273 (discussing the “fidelity-building” nature of the rebate schemes because of
their “disproportionate” financial penalties that would have been suffered for failure to purchase “at the
margin”), appeal dismissed, Case C-95/04 P, 2007 E.C.R. I-2331; Case T-203/01 Manufacture française
des pneumatiques Michelin v. Comm’n, 2003 E.C.R. II-4071, ¶¶ 87-88 (illustrating how additional
marginal sales can generate “greater” incentives to purchase “where the discounts are calculated on total
turnover achieved during a certain period than where they are calculated only tranche by tranche. The
longer the reference period, the more loyalty-inducing the quantity rebate system.”).
76. See Herbert Hovenkamp & Erik Hovenkamp, Complex Bundled Discounts and Antitrust Policy,
57 BUFF. L. REV. 1227, 1229 (2009) (providing an illustration of the potential foreclosure effect from
bundled discounting).
77. Id. at 1237–38 (“The competitive effects of bundled discounts are more difficult to assess when
we consider bundles that are more complex than simply 1 unit of product A and 1 unit of product B.”).
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impact on rivals may change . . . [and so] the competitive effects of
similar-appearing bundles can, in fact, be strikingly different.”78
In LePage’s, Inc. v. 3M, for example, retailers could earn discounts
on their 3M transparent tape purchases if they successfully met certain
purchase targets across a variety of 3M product lines.79 This fusion of
contestable and incontestable demand had the perniciously powerful
effect of foreclosing LePage’s from the tape market because it “created
a substantial incentive for each customer to meet the targets across all
[3M] product lines to maximize [3M’s] rebates.”80 The decision has
been subjected to academic criticism with the exclusionary effect
being described as “unclear”—a signal, perhaps, of the less than
obvious nature of such foreclosure. 81
Similarly, and perhaps more pointedly, in Eisai, Inc. v.
Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC, 82 the foreclosure arguments advanced
demonstrate the abstruse but powerful nature of rebate foreclosure. 83
Sanofi had initiated a loyalty scheme whereby hospitals would gain
discounts on Sanofi’s deep-vein thrombosis anticoagulant drug,
Lovenox, based on the amount purchased. 84 Below 75% of a hospital’s
total anticoagulant purchases resulted in a 1% discount; above 75% the
discount was much larger (anywhere between 9% and 30%),85 so at
the margin, there were substantial gains to be made. No contractual
obligation existed to purchase from Sanofi nor was there an indication
that supply would be cut off if customers did not purchase from
78. Id. at 1238.
79. LePage’s, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (describing 3M’s “multi-tiered
‘bundled rebate’ structure, which offered higher rebates when customers purchased products in a number
of 3M’s different product lines”).
80. Id. at 154 (emphasis added) (“The size of the rebate was linked to the number of product lines in
which targets were met, and the number of targets met by the buyer determined the rebate it would receive
on all of its purchases.” (emphasis added)).
81. Joanna Warren, Comment, LePage’s v. 3M: An Antitrust Analysis of Loyalty Rebates, 79 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1605, 1619, 1632 (2004) (“[T]he antitrust implications of loyalty rebates remain unclear. While
the recent LePage’s decision took an aggressive stance against what it found to be exclusionary conduct
in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act, the subsequent response by the legal and business
communities highlights the uncertainty facing market leaders over when their pricing decisions will be
subject to antitrust scrutiny.”).
82. 821 F.3d 394 (3d Cir. 2016).
83. See id. at 404.
84. Id. at 399, 400.
85. Id. at 400.
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Sanofi.86 Rather, Eisai sought to highlight the foreclosure effect in a
more subtle way—specifically, it maintained that there existed a
bundling of both contestable and incontestable demand. 87 Lovenox
had idiosyncratic uses in heart failure treatment, so hospitals always
needed some Lovenox—the incontestable portion of their demand. 88
But the discounts on this portion were dependent upon contestable
demand purchases of Lovenox, meaning hospitals would have had
magnified incentives to purchase Lovenox. 89 In effect, Eisai argued
that in contrast to LePage’s, Sanofi was bundling different kinds of
demand on the same product rather than different products, 90 thus
illustrating an even higher level of obscurity. Although the court
rejected this claim, it did so based on a lack of factual evidence and
seemed to accept that such a nuanced theory of harm was demonstrable
in the abstract.91 Therefore, it narrowed its reasoning to the facts before
it and seemed to abstain from any general conclusions about such a
subtle form of foreclosure.92 Indeed, SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly &
Co., which concededly came well before both of the foregoing cases,
did condemn bundled discounting as an anticompetitive practice. 93
C. Obscure Exclusion
The move from brick-and-mortar markets to digital technology
markets could expand the opportunities for exclusion and generate
much more pernicious forms of antitrust foreclosure. This expansion
should be apparent given consumers’ exacerbated susceptibility to
manipulation in the online world—particularly the fact that a digital
firm retains continuous and ubiquitous control over the product and a
consumer’s interaction with it.94 Indeed, the U.S. Congress recently
86. Id.
87. Id. at 401.
88. Eisai, 821 F.3d at 401.
89. Id. at 404, 406.
90. Id. at 405 (“Significantly, Eisai does not claim that Sanofi conditioned discounts on purchases
across various product lines, but on different types of demand for the same product.”).
91. Id. at 406.
92. See id.
93. SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 427 F. Supp. 1089, 1128–29 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff’d, 575 F.2d
1056 (3d Cir. 1978).
94. See infra Part II; see also Stylianou, supra note 40, at 251–52.
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noted subtle but powerful attempts by Google to foreclose rival Zoom
in online videoconferencing markets through methods designed to
“manipulate users into using . . . Google Meet.” 95 Relatedly, and as
stated at this Article’s outset, antitrust circles increasingly recognize
consumer biases as particularly ripe for manipulation in digital
platform markets.96
Some of the seminal digital antitrust cases to date, like Microsoft
Corp. v. Commission and Google Search (Shopping), seem to attest to
this notion that as technology has advanced alongside parallel
advancements in BE insights, foreclosure can be generated in much
more obscure ways. In Microsoft, 97 for example, the Commission
found that Microsoft abused its dominant position in the market for
operating systems by tying its media streaming application, Windows
Media Player (WMP), to the operating system. 98 Both BE and
technology played key roles in the foreclosure analysis. As to BE,
although Microsoft argued that other competing media players could
be installed on the Windows operating system, 99 the Court of First
Instance was swayed by the power of pre-installation—that is, WMP
being the default media player—to foreclose competition. 100
Specifically, although “downloading is in itself a technically
inexpensive way of distributing media players, vendors must deploy
major resources to ‘overcome end-users’ inertia and persuade them to
95. INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS, supra note 26 (“As Zoom emerged as the
market leader during the early stages of the [COVID-19] pandemic, Google introduced a new widget for
Meet inside Gmail. A similar message could be found inside Google Calendar, which prompted users to
‘Add Google Meet video conferencing’ to their appointments.”).
96. Stigler Antitrust Subcommittee Report, supra note 26 (describing how foreclosure can manifest
“when platforms exploit [consumers’] behavioral biases to keep consumers attached to their platforms
and make switching to alternatives more difficult. These tactics generally make consumers less receptive
to competitive alternatives—they lower contestability—and thus raise entry barriers.” (emphasis added));
see also Cecilia (Yixi) Cheng, Competition for Defaults: The Fight for Virtual Shelf Space 36
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3220267
[https://perma.cc/M97C-YTX9] (Aug. 23, 2018) (calling for antitrust authorities to recognize that
consumers do not behave rationally).
97. Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601.
98. Id. ¶¶ 21, 43-44.
99. Id. ¶ 993 (“[T]he inclusion of media functionality does not interfere with the functioning of
third-party media players. It is thus technically possible—and indeed common practice—for a
Windows-based client PC to run one or more third-party media players in addition to the media
functionality in Windows.”).
100. Id. ¶ 1049.
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ignore the pre-installation of [Windows Media Player].’” 101 This
disincentive to perfectly realize media player substitutes arose partly
because of transaction costs associated with downloading [I]nternet
applications. 102 As the Commission highlighted in its decision, “the
inconvenience of downloading a media player is in Microsoft’s own
view a real issue, at least in Europe” due to download complexity,
incomplete download efforts, and lack of broadband ubiquity. 103
This concern about default power is markedly reflected in the recent
U.S. Congress Report on the Investigation of Competition in Digital
Markets. 104 In the context of online search, for instance, the
Subcommittee identified “[a] third barrier to competition” whereby
Google “established extensive default positions across both browsers
and mobile devices.”105 In desktop markets, Google is the default on
Chrome (which has 51% of the U.S. market share), Safari (31% of U.S.
market share), and Firefox (5% of U.S. market share); in total, it is the
default search engine for 87% of the U.S. Internet browser market. 106
Although Google has attempted to publicly “downplay[]” the power
of defaults, Google’s internal documents, coupled with the vast sums
Google pays device manufacturers to be the default, would seem to
evince its “competitive significance.”107
101. Id. ¶ 1052 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
102. See Stucke, Implications of Behavioral Antitrust, supra note 21, at 5 & n.17.
103. Commission Decision C(2004) 900 of Mar. 24, 2004, Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft, ¶ 867,
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/37792/37792_4177_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TR69-KBTJ], aff’d in part, dismissed in part, Case T-201/04, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601; see
also Stucke, Implications of Behavioral Antitrust, supra note 21, at 4 (“Given this disincentive [of users
to use third-party media players], the [antitrust] concern was that Microsoft’s tying would weaken
competition among media players . . . . ”); Heinemann, supra note 15, at 224–25 (“The European
Commission . . . did not rely on rational, but on actual behaviour of consumers. Its line of argumentation
can best be explained by behavioural economics, for example by the influence of default settings on
human behaviour.” (emphasis added)).
104. INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS, supra note 26, at 6.
105. Id. at 81.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 82 (“[I]nternal documents show that when Google was still jostling for search market share,
Google executives closely tracked search defaults on Microsoft’s Internet Explorer and expressed concern
that non-Google defaults could impede Google Search. In an internal presentation about Internet
Explorer’s default search selection, Google recommended that users be given an initial opportunity to
select a search engine and that browsers minimize the steps required to change the default search engine.”
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Regarding technology, although rival media players could be
installed in addition to Microsoft’s WMP, the latter was not capable of
being uninstalled entirely, which in the court’s view, contributed to the
coercive effect. 108 Perhaps more perniciously, however, was that
whenever consumers would try to stream a media file on Internet
Explorer—Microsoft’s web browser—WMP would override a
third-party default media player (if one was set).109
In Google Search (Shopping),110 the Commission held that Google
abused its dominant position on the market for general search services
by giving more favorable search result positions to its own
comparison-shopping service and less visible and vivid search result
positions to rival comparison-shopping services.111 The EU General
Court recently upheld the Commission decision. 112 Again, technology
and BE contributed to the opaque nature of the exclusion.113
Regarding technology, Google’s choice of algorithms—which are
confidential as demonstrated by the Commission decision’s
redactions 114 —was the source of the abusive conduct because it
subjected rival comparison-shopping services to demotion in search

(footnote omitted)). Illustrative also in this respect is Google’s reportedly paying Apple $12 billion for
Google Search to be Safari’s default search engine, which is now being investigated by the U.S. DOJ. Id.
at 177–78, 345; Daisuke Wakabayashi & Jack Nicas, Apple, Google and a Deal that Controls the Internet,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/25/technology/apple-google-searchantitrust.html [https://perma.cc/G5RL-GPH9]; see also infra Part III.
108. Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶ 963 (“The coercion thus
applied to OEMs [Original Equipment Manufacturers] is not just contractual in nature, but also technical.
In effect, it is common ground that it was not technically possible to uninstall Windows Media Player.”).
109. Id. ¶ 974 (“Microsoft devised the mechanism in such a way that Windows Media Player could
override the default setting and reappear when the user used Internet Explorer to access media files
streamed over the Internet.”).
110. Commission Decision C(2017) 4444 of June 27, 2017, Case AT.39740 Google Search (Shopping)
[hereinafter
Google
Search
(Shopping)],
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39740/39740_14996_3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9UL2-9KZ6], aff’d sub nom. Case T-612/17 Google LLC & Alphabet, Inc. v. Comm’n
(Google Shopping), ECLI:EU:T:2021:763 (Nov. 10, 2021), appeal filed, Case C-48/22 P (Jan. 20, 2022).
111. Id. ¶¶ 341-342, 344 (“The Commission concludes that notwithstanding Google’s arguments to the
contrary, Google positions and displays, in its general search results pages, its own comparison shopping
service more favourably compared to competing comparison shopping services.” (citations omitted)).
112. Case T-612/17 Google LLC & Alphabet, Inc. v. Comm’n (Google Shopping),
ECLI:EU:T:2021:763, ¶¶ 703-704 (Nov. 10, 2021), appeal filed, Case C-48/22 P (Jan. 20, 2022).
113. See Patterson, supra note 41, at 28–29.
114. Google Search (Shopping), supra note 110, ¶ 349.
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results. 115 Note that rivals were subjected to specific “demot[ing]”
algorithms
but
Google
was
not,
despite
Google’s
comparison-shopping services having some of the same characteristics
as its rivals that led to the latter’s demotion.116 The inability to examine
both the “demot[ing]” characteristics and the workings of these
algorithms illustrates the pernicious nature of the exclusion (both are
largely redacted in the Commission decision).117
BE explanations of why “prominence” was so fundamental to the
Commission’s theory of harm also demonstrate this more obscure
form of exclusion. Even though consumers could switch within a few
seconds from Google’s comparison-shopping service to a rival’s
comparison-shopping service, consumer inertia and the magnetism of
default choices may have cut against this ability. 118 Again, the power
of the default has been more recently reflected in independent
competitor responses to recent investigations—like DuckDuckGo, a
search engine apparently forced to “invest in [its own] browser
technology” because if it is not set as the default search engine, it faces
“significant business challenges.” 119 But even producing a browser
comes with its own default challenges, “just one level up—with the
device makers requiring millions or billions of dollars to become a
default browser on a device.”120
In sum, foreclosure cases used to be more transparent in terms of
both the exclusionary effect and the excluding firm’s intent and
115. Id. ¶¶ 344-352 (“While competing comparison shopping services can appear only as generic
search results and are prone to the ranking of their web pages in generic search results on Google’s general
search results pages being reduced (‘demoted’) by certain algorithms, Google’s own comparison shopping
service is prominently positioned, displayed in rich format and is never demoted by those algorithms.”).
116. Id. ¶ 380 (“Google’s own comparison shopping service is not subject to the same ranking
mechanisms as competing comparison shopping services, including adjustment algorithms such as [ . . . ]
and Panda. This is despite the fact that Google’s own comparison shopping service exhibits several of the
characteristics that make competing comparison shopping services prone to being demoted by the [ . . . ]
and Panda algorithms.” (alterations in original) (emphasis added)).
117. See id. ¶¶ 349-358.
118. See Andreas Heinemann, Facts over Theory: The Contribution of Behavioral Economics to
Competition Law, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Jan. 2019, at 1, 5; Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust and
Monopolization, supra note 21.
119. INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS, supra note 26, at 83.
120. Id. (quoting Online Platforms and Market Power, Part 2: Innovation and Entrepreneurship:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Com. & Admin. L. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th
Cong. 5 (2019) (statement of Megan Gray, General Counsel and Policy Advocate, DuckDuckGo)).
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motive. 121 But technological developments seem to have rendered
exclusion much more subtle, especially when viewed in light of BE
and its deleterious effect on a market’s demand-side disciplining
capacities. In one broad sense, foreclosure might always be viewed as
manifesting from the demand-side. For instance, when a firm lowers
price to predatorily oust a rival, consumers switch away from the rival
and towards the price-lowering firm. When a firm refuses to supply an
essential input to another firm, the latter cannot then produce the
product that consumers desire. These paradigmatic foreclosure cases
can thus be conceptualized as a form of indirect demand-side
foreclosure. Yet in more ways than one, we seem to be moving towards
more direct but pernicious forms of demand-side antitrust
foreclosure—that is, the capacity of digital platform firms to
manipulatively leverage consumers’ cognitive anomalies in the online
world and generate more nuanced forms of demand-side
foreclosure.122 It is conduct targeting behavior rather than processes.
These phenomena would thus seem to confirm early predictions about
this powerful combination—that firms of the future would be much
more “empowered” to “surface and exploit how consumers tend to
deviate from rational decision[-]making on a previously unimaginable
scale.”123 Part II showcases that this emerging phenomenon is one that
perhaps deserves to be taken seriously.
II. CONSUMER SUSCEPTIBILITY TO MANIPULATION IN THE DIGITAL
WORLD
As digital platforms have grown more powerful and as BE is
beginning to make inroads into antitrust enforcement, regulators and
policymakers are becoming increasingly mindful of the potential for
“more subtle methods of influence that should cause
concern—specifically, actors may engage with market participants on
an emotional and cognitive level in order to influence their reasoning
121. Patterson, supra note 41, at 29–30.
122. See Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust and Monopolization, supra note 21, at 560 (“[M]onopolists can
devise . . . ways to exploit consumers’ biases and heuristics . . . to maintain their monopoly.”).
123. Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1018 (2014).
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and decisions regarding how to act.”124 Antitrust scholars have to some
extent already acknowledged these implications for antitrust
enforcement—that consumer biases may be manipulated to shape
demand. 125 But just how vulnerable consumers really are to
manipulation in the online world has been underdeveloped in antitrust
conversations.126
This Part seeks to showcase the exacerbated manipulability of
consumers in the digital platform world, thereby proffering it as one
potential context in which cognitive foreclosure deserves to be taken
seriously for antitrust enforcement purposes. Indeed, the online world
is perhaps bringing us closer to the scientist’s laboratory, where

124. Colangelo & Maggiolino, supra note 30, at 63–64; see COMPETITION & MKTS. AUTH., ONLINE
SEARCH: CONSUMER AND FIRM BEHAVIOUR: A REVIEW OF THE EXISTING LITERATURE 4 (Apr. 7, 2017)
(U.K.),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/60707
7/online-search-literature-review-7-april-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YHL-9T54] (noting that online
retailers has employed strategies to lure consumers to purchasing their products); Stigler Antitrust
Subcommittee Report, supra note 26, at 59 (“Because individuals are subject to behavioral biases,
consumers are vulnerable to a platform’s exploitative behavior.”); DIGIT. COMPETITION EXPERT PANEL,
supra note 26, at 4 (describing how digital markets are prone to tipping and can be exacerbated by
“behavioural limitations on the part of consumers for whom defaults and prominence are very important”);
INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS, supra note 26 (describing the use of
“manipulative design interfaces” as “pervasive” and that these “behavioral nudges” are being used to
entrench market power and extract user revenue).
125. Stucke, Implications of Behavioral Antitrust, supra note 21, at 26–28 (providing examples on how
firms can manipulate consumers); Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust and Monopolization, supra note 21, at 573
(“We can see how monopolists can use heuristics and biases (such as the status quo bias) to maintain their
monopoly.”); Bennett et al., supra note 16, at 122 (“[T]he fact that firms can make greater profits from
more confused consumers may provide firms with an incentive to exacerbate the impact of consumer
biases.”); Huffman, supra note 38, at 128–29.
126. Privacy and Surveillance scholars, for instance, have highlighted this manipulability to some
extent. See generally, e.g., Tal Z. Zarsky, Online Privacy, Tailoring, and Persuasion, in PRIVACY AND
TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY CONVERSATION 209 (Katherine J. Strandburg &
Daniela Stan Raicu eds., 2006) (arguing that collecting personal information online is more effective than
other media to manipulate consumers’ decisions); FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE
SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015) (exploring practices of internet
firms and how they use search algorithms and data to influence consumers’ decisions); SHOSHANA
ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW
FRONTIER OF POWER (2019) (coining the term “surveillance capitalism” to argue how tech companies
profit by manipulating people’s behavior); Calo, supra note 123 (discussing how digital markets change
how firms can influence consumers and how BE is the best vehicle for analyzing digital markets’ influence
on consumers).
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platforms have complete control over decision-making contexts, 127
along with more insightful and personalized consumer information
that can be voluminously, but covertly, collected. This enhanced
ability to manipulate, coupled with enhanced incentives,128 presents a
powerful combination in a context where cognitive heuristics and
biases may “predominate.”129
A. Amplified Heuristics and Biases
1. Information Overload, Information Complexity, and Attention
Scarcity
The rise of the Internet and particularly digital platforms—which
now mediate almost every aspect of our lives, pummeling us with
notifications, advertisements, news updates, among a plethora of other
information—has increased demand for our attention and therefore
limited our cognitive resources.130 More acutely, digital platform firms
127. Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market
Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 747 (1999) (“The behavioralist literature reviewed here makes
clear the potential for a new sort of market failure, market manipulation: [b]ecause individuals are subject
to a host of nonrational yet systematic cognitive phenomena, any party who has control over a
decision[-]making context can influence the perceptions of the decisionmaker.” (second emphasis
added)); see also Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler & Helen Nissenbaum, Technology, Autonomy, and
Manipulation, INTERNET POL’Y REV., June 30, 2019, at 1, 6 [hereinafter Susser et al., Technology,
Autonomy, and Manipulation] (“[I]t is not difficult to see why information technology is uniquely suited
to facilitating manipulative influences. . . . [P]ervasive digital surveillance puts our decision-making
vulnerabilities on permanent display.”); Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler & Helen Nissenbaum, Online
Manipulation: Hidden Influences in a Digital World, 4 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 1, 29 (2019) [hereinafter
Susser et al., Online Manipulation] (“[A]s digital technologies are incorporated into all aspects of people’s
everyday lives, they become increasingly susceptible to [online] manipulation. Widespread digital
surveillance means it takes little effort to identify people’s vulnerabilities.”).
128. See infra Part II.B.
129. Shafir & LeBoeuf, supra note 29.
130. Maria Sicilia & Salvador Ruiz, The Effects of the Amount of Information on Cognitive Responses
in Online Purchasing Tasks, 9 ELEC. COM. RSCH. & APPLICATIONS 183, 183 (2010) (“Anyone who has
spent some time on the Internet has likely felt overwhelmed with the enormous amount of information
available.” (citations omitted)); Ming-Hui Huang, Information Load: Its Relationship to Online
Exploratory and Shopping Behavior, 20 INT’L J. INFO. MGMT. 337, 337 (2000); Byung-Kwan Lee &
Wei-Na Lee, The Effect of Information Overload on Consumer Choice Quality in an On-Line
Environment, 21 PSYCH. & MKTG. 159, 160 (2004) (“The information-rich nature of the on-line
environment can easily become a trap for information overload to occur . . . .”); Nicholas H. Lurie,
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now constantly compete for our limited attention to sell it to third
parties who value that attention. 131
For example, the massive increase in creative content—like
Spotify’s seventy-million song library (with an additional 60,000
songs “ingested” every day)132 or the more than one billion hours of
YouTube content consumed per day (with 500 hours of content
uploaded to YouTube every minute)133—illustrates the “magnitude of
the increase” in information and, consequently, the significant taxing
effect this may have on our cognitive capacities. Thus, it is no wonder
that “faced with all this complexity, people try to keep things
simple—an effort that in itself turns out to be quite complex.”134 More
specifically, consumers may “deal with scale and complexity using
cognitive biases encoded deep in our pre-digital history.”135
Indeed, Stucke and Ezrachi recently noted that too much choice can
generate choice overload, which results in an overdose.136 This results
in confusion and suboptimal decision-making, rendering users ripe for

Decision Making in Information-Rich Environments: The Role of Information Structure, 30 J. CONSUMER
RSCH. 473, 473 (2004); see also John M. Newman, Antitrust in Attention Markets: Objections and
Responses, 59 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 743, 746 (2020) (“[A] shift to an information-rich society tends to
cause a corresponding shift to an attention-scarce society.”); Ellen P. Goodman, Media Policy out of the
Box: Content Abundance, Attention Scarcity, and the Failures of Digital Markets, 19 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1389, 1392 (2004) (“Today, the scarce resource is attention . . . . [t]he spread of digital innovations,
in the form of networks, production techniques, and consumer products, has multiplied content and freed
audiences from network schedules. Consumers now sit in the eye of a storm of bits surging through cable
and satellite channels, DVDs, video games, and websites.” (emphasis added)).
131. David S. Evans, Attention Rivalry Among Online Platforms, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 313,
313 (2013) (“Many online businesses seek and provide attention. These online attention rivals provide
products and features to obtain the attention of consumers and sell some of that attention, through other
products and services, to merchants, developers, and others who value it.”).
132. Tim Ingham, Over 60,000 Tracks Are Now Uploaded to Spotify Every Day. That’s Nearly One per
Second, MUSIC BUS. WORLDWIDE (Feb. 24, 2021), https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/over60000-tracks-are-now-uploaded-to-spotify-daily-thats-nearly-one-per-second/ [https://perma.cc/4M6T4UFA].
133. Kit Smith, 57 Fascinating and Incredible YouTube Statistics, BRANDWATCH (Feb. 21, 2020),
https://www.brandwatch.com/blog/youtube-stats/ [https://perma.cc/G87R-3YGC].
134. ALISTAIR RENNIE, JONNY PROTHEROE, CLAIRE CHARRON & GERALD BREATNACH, THINK WITH
GOOGLE, DECODING DECISIONS: MAKING SENSE OF THE MESSY MIDDLE 8 (2020),
https://www.thinkwithgoogle.com/_qs/documents/9998/Decoding_Decisions_The_Messy_Middle_of_P
urchase_Behavior.pdf [https://perma.cc/TS5U-DRES].
135. Id. at 6.
136. MAURICE E. STUCKE & ARIEL EZRACHI, COMPETITION OVERDOSE: HOW FREE MARKET
MYTHOLOGY TRANSFORMED US FROM CITIZEN KINGS TO MARKET SERVANTS 93–120 (2020).
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exploitation.137 In some instances, the overload is so great that choice
is foregone altogether. Iyengar and Lepper, for example, found that
contrary to “the popular notion that the more choice, the better,” less
optionality actually results in more uptake.138 In one field experiment,
jam-tasting booths that contained just six jams as opposed to
twenty-four led to 30% of consumers actually purchasing jam in the
former context and just 3% in the latter context.139
Much of the foregoing should perhaps not be surprising because the
source of mental biases and heuristics, as noted at this Article’s outset,
is the bounded cognitive capacity that all humans face. Indeed, the
cognitive cost of a “click” has been quantitatively determined to range
from $39 to $44 when moving from one webpage to another webpage
and around $6.24 when moving position on the “exact same
webpage,”140 which would seem to support earlier arguments in the
antitrust debate about “cognitive[ly] cost[ly]” switching. 141 Thus, if
simply clicking to another web page—an action that can take just
137. Id. at 117.
138. Sheena S. Iyengar & Mark R. Lepper, When Choice Is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too Much
of a Good Thing?, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 995, 995 (2000).
139. Id. at 997 (“Thus, consumers initially exposed to limited choices proved considerably more likely
to purchase the product than consumers who had initially encountered a much larger set of options.”).
140. Cheng, supra note 96, at 7–8. For quantitative determinations of how “cognitively costly” Internet
searching is, see Anindya Ghose, Panagiotis G. Ipeirotis & Beibei Li, Search Less, Find More? Examining
Limited Consumer Search with Social Media and Product Search Engines, in THIRTY-THIRD
INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE
ON
INFORMATION
SYSTEMS
1,
3
(2012),
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/PanosIpeirotis/publication/237044875_Search_Less_Find_More_Examining_Limited_Consumer_Search_wit
h_Social_Media_and_Product_Search_Engines/links/00b7d530b37d3c3ac9000000/Search-Less-FindMore-Examining-Limited-Consumer-Search-with-Social-Media-and-Product-Search-Engines.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6Z3Y-CUGG], where the authors found that “[o]n average, the effort of continuing to
search an extra page on search engines costs $39.15, while the effort of continuing to search an additional
screen position on the same page costs $6.24.”; Sergei Koulayev, Estimating Demand in Online Search
Markets, with Application to Hotel Bookings 24 (Mar. 10, 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/SergeiKoulayev/publication/265453163_Estimating_demand_in_online_search_markets_with_application_to_
hotel_bookings/links/5614873308aed47facee607b/Estimating-demand-in-online-search-markets-withapplication-to-hotel-bookings.pdf [https://perma.cc/WJ3D-4JU7], where the author estimated the dollar
cost of searching an extra page to be around $43.80 in the context of hotel bookings; and Erik
Brynjolfsson, Astrid A. Dick & Michael D. Smith, A Nearly Perfect Market?: Differentiation vs. Price in
Consumer Choice, 8 QUANTITATIVE MKTG. & ECON. 1, 27 (2010), where the authors estimate the dollar
value to the consumer of scrolling down the same web page to a lower location to be around $6.55.
141. Adam Candeub, Behavioral Economics, Internet Search, and Antitrust, 9 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR
INFO. SOC’Y 407, 410 (2014) (“[C]ontrary to many assumptions in this debate, the cognitive cost of the
click that initiates a switch to a competing service can be quite high.”).
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seconds—may “cognitive[ly] cost” anywhere between $39 and $44,
then we should expect to see more reliance on mental shortcuts to
ameliorate the cognitively taxing effect of searching the Internet.142 As
Behavioural Insights Team Managing Director Elisabeth Costa and
Chief Executive David Halpern note, “Many of the failures and
distortions in digital markets are behavioural in nature. To govern and
regulate better, we must first understand how our behavioural biases
manifest and are amplified in online environments . . . .”143
An illuminating example of how biases may become magnified in
the online world (and thereby render consumers more susceptible to
manipulation) is the default bias, which is a product of consumer
inertia and bounded willpower.144 Specifically, default positions may
apply “especially forcefully in the online world” and have an amplified
impact on consumer choice as compared to their influence in
brick-and-mortar contexts.145 For instance, in defining defaults as the
option that is “least [costly] . . . to discover,” Cheng compares
attention percentage distribution across several option positions in (1)
brick-and-mortar shelf spaces and (2) virtual shelf spaces. 146 In the
former context, if a product moves from worst to best shelf space, sales
on average could increase by 39%.147 Moreover, a notable result from
another study is that no brick-and-mortar shelf—regardless of
level—could command more than 30% of consumer attention. 148 In
stark contrast, in the digital context, an option positioned on the top of
142. Id.; Cheng, supra note 96, at 8.
143. ELISABETH COSTA & DAVID HALPERN, THE BEHAVIOURAL INSIGHTS TEAM, THE BEHAVIOURAL
SCIENCE OF ONLINE HARM AND MANIPULATION AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT: AN EXPLORATORY PAPER
TO SPARK IDEAS AND DEBATE 12 (Apr. 15, 2019) (U.K.) (emphasis added), https://www.bi.team/wpcontent/uploads/2019/04/BIT_The-behavioural-science-of-online-harm-and-manipulation-and-what-todo-about-it_Single.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7X4-3PT2].
144. This is also called the status quo bias. See discussion infra Part III.
145. Cheng, supra note 96, at 12 (emphasis added).
146. Id. at 9–11, 23.
147. Id. at 23; see Xavier Drèze, Stephen J. Hoch & Mary E. Purk, Shelf Management and Space
Elasticity, 70 J. RETAILING 301, 318 (1994). But see Pierre Chandon, J. Wesley Hutchinson, Eric T.
Bradlow & Scott H. Young, Does In-Store Marketing Work? Effects of the Number and Position of Shelf
Facings on Brand Attention and Evaluation at the Point of Purchase, J. MKTG., Nov. 2009, at 1, 1–2, 13
(concluding that the impacts of product position on attention and evaluation are “mixed”).
148. Denis Drexler & Martin Souček, The Level of Shelves and Space Solution as One of the Key
Factors for Consumer Attention, 65 ACTA UNIVERSITATIS AGRICULTURAE ET SILVICULTURAE
MENDELIANAE BRUNENSIS 1679, 1683 fig.2 (2017) (Czech).
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page two of Google’s search page, for example, receives just over 1%
of “all traffic,” while the highest ranked position can command almost
an average of 35% of all clicks.149 More pointedly, if Google moves
an option from rank one to three on page one of its search results,
traffic to that option can decrease by 50%.150 Additionally, traffic can
fall by as much as 85% if the option is moved from rank one to rank
ten—even if the option still remains on page one of Google’s search
results.151 This demonstrates the disproportionate impact defaults can
have on consumer choice in digital markets vis-à-vis their power in
brick-and-mortar markets.
The foregoing analyses would seem to signal that in digital markets,
consumer decision-making can take a dramatic shift from System 2 to
System 1—that is, from conscious, analytic thinking to automatic,
unconscious, and associative thinking 152 —thereby rendering
consumers ripe for manipulation 153 and distracting them from making
optimal purchasing decisions. This proposition has seen empirical
validation, 154 with Sicilia and Ruiz notably finding that “too much
information causes more selectivity and prejudices [cognitive]
processing.”155

149. Cheng, supra note 96, at 25.
150. Id.; Google Search (Shopping), supra note 110, ¶ 460.
151. Cheng, supra note 96, at 25; Google Search (Shopping), supra note 110, ¶ 460.
152. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 19–105 (paperback ed. 2013).
153. Such manipulation can include priming and persuasion. See generally Erin J. Strahan, Steven J.
Spencer & Mark P. Zanna, Subliminal Priming and Persuasion: Striking While the Iron Is Hot, 38 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 556 (2002) (conducting three studies to show how certain techniques,
including priming, can persuade people to perform certain tasks).
154. Lee & Lee, supra note 130; Lurie, supra note 130; Hume Winzar & Preben Savik, Measuring
Information Overload on the World Wide Web, AM. MKTG. ASS’N CONF. PROC., Winter 2002, at 439, 439
(“An on-line experiment supports previous research on Information Overload. As volume of information,
measured by number of brands and range of brand features of an on-line store, increases then confusion
and uncertainty increase and less information is accessed.” (emphasis added)); Sicilia & Ruiz, supra note
130, at 189 (“When the amount of information offered through a website is high, content elaboration
clearly diminishes and irrelevant thoughts increase . . . .”).
155. Sicilia & Ruiz, supra note 130, at 189 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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B. Amplified Abilities to Manipulate
1. Control
Digital platforms’ ability to continuously and ubiquitously control
the consumer’s interaction with its service offers another reason why
consumers can be rendered increasingly susceptible to manipulation in
the online world. Not unlike the scientific researcher, 156 digital
platforms are uniquely positioned to totally control digital platform
“gestalt”157 and manipulate platform context and interface, 158 product
positions, and information in competitively malicious ways that may
lock in consumers.
This increased ability to manipulate overshadows that same ability
in brick-and-mortar markets. Once a consumer purchases a bicycle, for
example, the seller’s control over the consumer becomes extinguished,
along with their ability to dictate the consumer’s interaction with the
product. Ex ante the purchase, the seller had the ability to perhaps
control the consumer’s perception of the product along price-quality
parameters; ex post, this control over the consumer vanishes. This
contrasts significantly with the online world, where platforms
continuously and ubiquitously control a user’s interaction with the
product, their perception of it, and perhaps most significantly for
competition purposes, their interactions with same-side and other-side
users.159
156. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 127, at 724. Similar to the platform, “[i]t is this researcher who is in
control of the substance, form, and frame of the survey.” Id.
157. Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market
Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1446 (1999) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar, Some Evidence of
Market Manipulation].
158. This phenomenon is called “atmospherics”—”the conscious designing of space to create certain
effects in buyers.” Philip Kotler, Atmospherics as a Marketing Tool, 49 J. RETAILING, no. 4, Winter
1973–1974, at 48, 50 (emphasis omitted); see also GORDON FOXALL, RONALD GOLDSMITH & STEPHEN
BROWN, CONSUMER PSYCHOLOGY FOR MARKETING 201 (Int’l Thomson Bus. Press 2d ed. 1998) (1994)
(“‘Atmospherics’ refers to factors that may be designed into or manipulated within retail spaces in order
to produce emotional and, in turn, behavioral effects in consumers.” (citation omitted)).
159. For an explanation of the competitive significance of same-side and cross-side network effects in
platform markets, see MAURICE E. STUCKE & ALLEN P. GRUNES, BIG DATA AND COMPETITION POLICY
162–69 (2016). See also John M. Newman, Antitrust in Digital Markets, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1497, 1514–15
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To some extent, this concern has already been expressed in
brick-and-mortar markets in the context of anxieties over
private-labeling and their potential to generate welfare-reducing
effects for markets. 160 This is because when a distributor creates a
private-label brand to compete with the upstream manufacturer’s
brand, the former may not only possess incentives to self-preference161
but also has an enhanced ability given that they now control the
“arena” in which competition takes place. 162 Yet this concern arguably
becomes amplified in digital platform markets because of the ability
of a platform to manipulatively “steer[] [and] control[]” users by
nefariously compromising their capacity to make decisions
autonomously. 163 As the Stigler Committee explains, “What is
noteworthy . . . is the platform’s detailed, . . . minute-by-minute
control over their interface. This . . . enables platforms to create a
façade of competition, choice, and autonomy when in fact users are
being directed with behavioral techniques.”164

(2019); Amit Goldenberg & James J. Gross, Digital Emotion Contagion, 24 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCIS.
316, 318 (2020) (differentiating between digital and non-digital interactions and how the latter “are almost
always mediated by companies who control and manipulate both the content that users see and how they
respond to each other”).
160. See generally Ariel Ezrachi, Unchallenged Market Power? The Tale of Supermarkets, Private
Labels, and Competition Law, 33 WORLD COMPETITION 257 (2010) (discussing how private labels affect
consumer welfare).
161. This is not entirely true because a distributor can be competitively constrained by other retailers
such that if a retailer does not treat a manufacturer’s brand equitably, the manufacturer can shift their
distribution to another retailer. See A. Fernandez Nogales & M. Gomez Suarez, Shelf Space Management
of Private Labels: A Case Study in Spanish Retailing, 12 J. RETAILING & CONSUMER SERVS. 205, 214
(2005) (“[Retailers] . . . realize that they may lose sales if they do not assign the necessary space to
national brands, which also help to enhance store image.”).
162. Ariel Ezrachi & Ketan Ahuja, Private Labels, Brands and Competition Law Enforcement, in
BRANDS, COMPETITION LAW AND IP 179, 182 (Deven R. Desai, Ioannis Lianos & Spencer Weber Waller
eds., 2015); Ezrachi, supra note 160, at 262 (“Control of the distribution channel, shelf space, promotion,
and pricing . . . empower the retailer in its relationship with the brand manufacturer. . . . [S]uch control
provides the retailer with a decisive advantage over brand suppliers.”).
163. Susser et al., Technology, Autonomy, and Manipulation, supra note 127, at 3.
164. Stigler Antitrust Subcommittee Report, supra note 26, at 60; see also ARIEL EZRACHI & MAURICE
E. STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION: THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF THE ALGORITHM-DRIVEN ECONOMY
27 (2016) (referring to the example of The Truman Show to describe how “[n]ew technologies are
changing the dynamics of competition as we know it and are giving rise to a new environment,” and how
“[w]e . . . may think that we’re ordinary consumers with ordinary lives with unremarkable purchases[, but
w]e have no idea about how, and the extent to which, we are being exploited”).
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a. Big Data
Antitrust is already familiar with Big Data’s capacity to foreclose
new entry. 165 Now, we highlight Big Data’s ability to empower
platforms to manipulate consumers and impair their decision-making
autonomy, thereby potentially foreclosing competition from the
demand-side. Big Data thus offers an additional factor contributing to
the increased manipulability of consumers in digital platform contexts.
Indeed, if “supermarket manipulation” was not already a concern for
consumer decision-making autonomy because of the ability to “bias
consumer decisions” with “a battery of behavioral studies and
psychological analyses,” 166 then the online world would certainly
seem to exacerbate this potential through Big Data analytics. As
Colangelo and Maggiolino note, “In the current data economy, some
scholars allude to the possibility that companies are able to shape
demand by offering false and misleading information, and by
distributing unduly persuasive information which exploits cognitive
vulnerabilities of individual consumers learned by such companies
through past interactions.”167 This capacity of Big Data to supercharge
behavioral manipulation, which some industry executives have likened
to possessing “a spy camera on the production floor,” 168 is being
recognized not only by scholars 169 but also by international regulators
and policymakers.170

165. See INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS, supra note 26, at 42 (“The
accumulation of data can serve as another powerful barrier to entry for firms in the digital economy.”);
see also Luigi Zingales & Filippo Maria Lancieri, Stigler Committee on Digital Platforms: Policy Brief,
in STIGLER COMMITTEE ON DIGITAL PLATFORMS: FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 6, 8.
166. Hanson & Kysar, Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, supra note 157, at 1450.
167. Colangelo & Maggiolino, supra note 30 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
168. INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS, supra note 26, at 43.
169. See generally Susser et al., Online Manipulation, supra note 127; Zarsky, supra note 126, at
219–20; Calo, supra note 123; Karen Yeung, ‘Hypernudge’: Big Data as a Mode of Regulation by Design,
20 INFO. COMMC’N & SOC’Y 118, 118 (2017) (“Big Data analytic nudges are extremely powerful and
potent due to their networked, continuously updated, dynamic and pervasive nature . . . .”).
170. Stigler Antitrust Subcommittee Report, supra note 26, at 60 (“With big data and machine learning,
firms are able to understand and manipulate individual preferences at a scale that goes far beyond what is
possible in traditional markets. This capability is qualitatively new. The environment is characterized by
extreme asymmetries of information and analytical capacity between the platform and the user. This
enables firms to charge higher prices . . . and engage in behavioral discrimination, allowing firms to
extract more value from users where they are weak.”).
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Consider in this regard the subtle but powerful nudging of users
towards outcomes that are in the nudger’s interests, which some have
labeled “hypernudging.”171 This conduct seeks to mold and guide user
behavior in algorithmically driven ways “by offering ‘suggestions’
intended to prompt the user to make decisions preferred by [the
nudger].”172 In this respect, Big Data may empower digital platform
firms to personalize users’ choice contexts and “channel user choices
in directions preferred by the choice architect through processes that
are subtle, unobtrusive, yet extraordinarily powerful.”173
Examples of user profiling demonstrate how sophisticated Big Data
has become and how much digital platforms know about its users.174
Uber, for instance, has developed technology to discern when a user
may be intoxicated by comparing a host of data points against that
particular user’s average data outputs, which may include the way the
user is walking (staggered or straight line) or the angle at which the
user is holding their phone.175 The dating platform Tinder can assign
each user a secret internal rating of “desirability” and rank users from
most to least desirable to facilitate more optimal matching—all of
which stems from a complex algorithm. 176 The couch surfing platform
Airbnb can identify a user’s trustworthiness and psychopathic
proclivities derived from multiple data points, such as the user’s social

171. Yeung, supra note 169at 118, 119, 122.
172. Id. at 121 (citation omitted); see also Evan Selinger & Thomas P. Seager, Digital Jiminy Crickets,
SLATE (July 13, 2012, 6:33 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2012/07/ethical-decision-making-appsdamage-our-ability-to-make-moral-choices.html [https://perma.cc/F2VQ-3FSF].
173. Yeung, supra note 169, at 119; see also Susser et al., Online Manipulation, supra note 127
(“Digital platforms are the perfect medium through which to leverage [insights into users’ vulnerabilities].
And because information technology mediates so much of so many people’s lives, there is virtually
limitless opportunity to invisibly influence.” (emphasis added)).
174. See Day & Stemler, supra note 37, at 16–22 (discussing examples of companies using tactics to
manipulate online consumers).
175. Id. at 17–18; Jordan Crook, Uber Applies for Patent That Would Detect Drunk Passengers,
TECHCRUNCH (June 11, 2018, 8:45 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/06/11/uber-applies-for-patentthat-would-detect-drunk-passengers/ [https://perma.cc/KHY2-APDT].
176. Day & Stemler, supra note 37, at 18; Austin Carr, I Found Out My Secret Internal Tinder Rating
and Now I Wish I Hadn’t, FAST CO. (Jan. 11, 2016), https://www.fastcompany.com/3054871/whats-yourtinder-score-inside-the-apps-internal-ranking-system [https://perma.cc/EGV6-Y96K].
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media and lifestyle choices. 177 And the well-known case of Max
Schrems, who brought a case against Facebook for disclosure of his
personal data based on European law, found that his own Facebook
file was 1,200 pages in length.178 This was at a time when data was
tracked “singular[ly]” 179 on Facebook, compared to its current
pluralistic tracking across “millions of independently owned websites
and mobile applications”180 that use any of Facebook’s plug-ins like
the “Like” button. Even “thinking” certain things, like typing words
and sentences into a status update field, for instance, but then deleting
it, is still tracked and recorded.181
These powerful insights into our psychological make-up showcase
the extent to which a platform could calibrate the user experience in
tailored ways and leverage such insights to manipulate us into
decisions that are in the platform’s potentially anticompetitive
interests.
b. Addiction-Induced Cognitive Impairment
Platforms possess enhanced incentives to catch and retain users’
attention for as long as possible, 182 which may generate addiction and,
177. Day & Stemler, supra note 37, at 18; Whitney Kimball, Airbnb’s Software Patent Rates Your
Psychopathy Based on Your Social Media Activity, GIZMODO (Jan. 7, 2020, 2:10 PM),
https://gizmodo.com/airbnbs-software-patent-rates-your-psychopathy-based-on-1840855354
[https://perma.cc/JZ5D-Y68Y].
178. Olivia Solon, How Much Data Did Facebook Have on One Man? 1,200 Pages of Data in 57
Categories, WIRED (Dec. 28, 2012, 5:11 PM) (U.K.), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/privacy-versusfacebook [https://perma.cc/P4AQ-3JLS].
179. Dina Srinivasan, The Antitrust Case Against Facebook: A Monopolist’s Journey Towards
Pervasive Surveillance in Spite of Consumers’ Preference for Privacy, 16 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 39, 41
(2019).
180. Id. The “Like” button appears on over 1 million websites. Websites Using Facebook Like Button,
BUILTWITH, https://trends.builtwith.com/websitelist/Facebook-Like-Button [https://perma.cc/YL25PV4C].
181. Sauvik Das & Adam Kramer, Self-Censorship on Facebook, 7 PROC. SEVENTH INT’L AAAI CONF.
ON
WEBLOGS
&
SOC.
MEDIA,
no.
1,
2013,
at
120,
120,
122,
https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/ICWSM/article/view/14412/14261[https://perma.cc/AGD4-MX5B];
Jennifer Golbeck, On Second Thought . . . , SLATE, https://slate.com/technology/2013/12/facebook-selfcensorship-what-happens-to-the-posts-you-dont-publish.html [https://perma.cc/EZE3-7ZJX] (Dec. 16,
2013, 11:20 AM) (“Unfortunately, the code in your browser that powers Facebook still knows what you
typed—even if you decide not to publish it. It turns out that the things you explicitly choose not to share
aren’t entirely private.” (footnote omitted)).
182. See infra Part II.B.2.
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consequently, a significant impairment of cognitive processing
capacity. This reduced user cognition constitutes an additional element
that may render consumers increasingly ripe for behavioral
manipulation in digital platform contexts.
Neuroscience research reveals, for example, that heightened
Internet use can lead to reductions in gray matter in users’ brains,183
abnormal sensitivity to reward-like structures which implicates the
“dopaminergic neural system,” 184 and increased impulsivity due to
concomitant decreases in self-control. 185 Consider that a study of
WeChat users, for instance, found that gray matter reduction can lead
to users experiencing reward sensitivity, 186 “suggesting that digital
addiction begets more addiction,” 187 which, in turn, may subsume
users into a perpetual “dream-like” state and subject them to a potential
host of manipulative strategies.
That online users in the aggregate spend around 950 million hours
per day on Facebook platforms may mean that the user’s dream has
already begun.188 Prolonged use of Google platforms may also tend to
183. See Kai Yuan, Ping Cheng, Tao Dong, Yanzhi Bi, Lihong Xing, Dahua Yu, Limei Zhao, Minghao
Dong et al., Cortical Thickness Abnormalities in Late Adolescence with Online Gaming Addiction, PLOS
ONE,
Jan.
2013,
at
1,
1–2,
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0053055&type=printable
[https://perma.cc/QM5V-TWL5].
184. Sang Hee Kim, Sang-Hyun Baik, Chang Soo Park, Su Jin Kim, Sung Won Choi & Sang Eun Kim,
Reduced Striatal Dopamine D2 Receptors in People with Internet Addiction, 22 NEUROREP. 407, 407
(2011); see also Soon-Beom Hong, Andrew Zalesky, Luca Cocchi, Alex Fornito, Eun-Jung Choi,
Ho-Hyun Kim, Jeong-Eun Suh, Chang-Dai Kim et al., Decreased Functional Brain Connectivity in
Adolescents
with
Internet
Addiction,
PLOS
ONE,
Feb.
2013,
at
1,
1,
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0057831&type=printable
[https://perma.cc/BV3A-GWAP].
185. See Sergey Tereshchenko & Edward Kasparov, Neurobiological Risk Factors for the Development
of Internet Addiction in Adolescents, BEHAV. SCIS., June 14, 2019, at 1, 3.
186. Christian Montag, Zhiying Zhao, Cornelia Sindermann, Lei Xu, Meina Fu, Jialin Li, Xiaoxiao
Zheng, Keshuang Li et al., Internet Communication Disorder and the Structure of the Human Brain:
Initial Insights on WeChat Addiction, SCI. REPS., Feb. 1, 2018, at 1, 1,
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-018-19904-y.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FWY-XESH].
187. Day & Stemler, supra note 37, at 20.
188. Adam Levy, People Still Spend an Absurd Amount of Time on Facebook, MOTLEY FOOL (Feb. 6,
2018, 9:32 AM), https://www.fool.com/investing/2018/02/06/people-still-spend-an-absurd-amount-oftime-on-fac.aspx [https://perma.cc/RJ6A-33PQ]. The New York Times also noted that we spend more time
on Facebook, Instagram, and Messenger—fifty times more, in fact—than on other activities except
watching television. James B. Stewart, Facebook Has 50 Minutes of Your Time Each Day. It Wants More.,
N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/06/business/facebook-bends-the-rules-ofaudience-engagement-to-its-advantage.html [https://perma.cc/JZP2-VAGW].
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show this (more than one billion hours of YouTube content are
consumed per day). 189 Additionally, consider that we spend on average
somewhere between 3.5 and 4.5 hours per day on our mobile
phones. 190 Indeed, one study administering a self-assessment
questionnaire about Internet addiction revealed almost half of those
sampled agreed or strongly agreed with the statement “I am addicted
to the [I]nternet.” 191 It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that
psychologists have coined the term “nomophobia” (fear of no mobile
phone), with some campaigning for the phobia to be added to the
American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (Fifth Edition): DSM-5™, the manual for
diagnosing and taxonomizing mental health disorders.192 Behavioral
manifestations of the above addictions further evidence the notion that
the dream may have already begun for online consumers. Systematic
usage, anxiety, “‘ringxiety’ (i.e., repeatedly checking one’s phone for
messages, sometimes leading to phantom ring tones), constant
availability, preference for mobile communication over
face[-]to[-]face communication, and financial problems” are all
symptomatic of addiction. 193 Given that attention capture and retention
is a digital platform’s primordial concern, 194 digital platform users
may very well be moving towards the world of cognitive foreclosure
hinted to at this Article’s outset.
189. Cristos Goodrow, You Know What’s Cool? A Billion Hours, YOUTUBE OFF. BLOG (Feb. 27, 2017),
https://blog.youtube/news-and-events/you-know-whats-cool-billion-hours/
[https://perma.cc/9FH5ZVT9] (“If you were to sit and watch a billion hours of YouTube, it would take you over 100,000 years.”).
190. Rani Molla, Tech Companies Tried to Help Us Spend Less Time on Our Phones. It Didn’t Work.,
VOX: RECODE (Jan. 6, 2020, 12:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/1/6/21048116/techcompanies-time-well-spent-mobile-phone-usage-data [https://perma.cc/89A4-W6FE].
191. Xavier Carbonell, Andrés Chamarro, Ursula Oberst, Beatriz Rodrigo & Mariona Prades,
Problematic Use of the Internet and Smartphones in University Students: 2006–2017, INT’L J. ENV’T
RSCH. & PUB. HEALTH, Mar. 8, 2018, at 1, 5, https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/15/3/475/htm
[https://perma.cc/GL2V-MB8E].
192. Daria J. Kuss & Mark D. Griffiths, Social Networking Sites and Addiction: Ten Lessons Learned,
INT’L J. ENV’T RSCH. & PUB. HEALTH, Mar. 17, 2017, at 1, 9, https://www.mdpi.com/16604601/14/3/311/htm [https://perma.cc/HD2B-Y3X7]; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 5TH EDITION (DSM-5) (5th ed. 2013).
193. Kuss & Griffiths, supra note 192.
194. See STUCKE & EZRACHI, supra note 136, at 197–98 (“Many app developers compete so hard to
addict us, because the longer we spend on their apps—the more ‘eyeball time’ we put in—the more
personal data they can extract from us and the more money they can make by selling access to that data
to advertisers.”).
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2. Amplified Incentives to Manipulate
Along with amplified manipulation abilities, digital platform firms
also possess intensified incentives to engage in user manipulation due
to competitive pressures, the potential ease of user switching, and
inclinations to engage in more pernicious forms of self-preferencing.
a. Competitive Pressures
One reason why firms may possess magnified incentives to
manipulate consumers’ behavioral shortcomings is that cognitive
biases can “present profit-maximizing opportunities that [digital firms]
must take advantage of in order to stay apace with competition.”195
This incentive seems all the more real and amplified in digital platform
markets where, as illustrated above, cognitive biases become
magnified196 and, therefore, become riper for manipulation. We may
thus encounter instances of “races to the bottom”; as one firm begins
engaging in these manipulative tactics, others may have to as well.
Studies demonstrate that it is, at the very least, unclear whether
competition will eradicate manipulation of consumer biases and in
several instances show that more rivalry may even exacerbate
incentives to manipulate. 197 Perhaps most importantly, some studies
reveal that, when faced with a decision to compete or manipulate, firms
will choose to manipulate.198 As the Office of Fair Trading concludes
after a review of various studies across a variety of industries:
The broad picture in the class of models reviewed in this part
195. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 127, at 726 (emphasis omitted).
196. See supra Part II.A.
197. STEFFEN HUCK, JIDONG ZHOU & CHARLOTTE DUKE, OFF. OF FAIR TRADING, OFT1324,
CONSUMER BEHAVIOURAL BIASES IN COMPETITION: A SURVEY 68 (2011) (U.K.),
https://londoneconomics.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Consumer-behavioural-biases-incompetition-OFT1.pdf/ [https://perma.cc/WF28-E97T] (“The most striking result of the literature so far
is that increasing competition through fostering entry of more firms may not on its own always improve
outcomes for consumers. . . . In the presence of [cognitively biased consumers] it is no longer clear that
firms necessarily have an incentive to compete by offering better deals. Rather, they can focus on
exploiting biased consumers who are very likely to purchase from them regardless of price and quality.”).
198. See, e.g., Ioana Chioveanu & Jidong Zhou, Price Competition with Consumer Confusion, 59
MGMT. SCI. 2450, 2450 (2013); Bruce I. Carlin, Strategic Price Complexity in Retail Financial Markets,
91 J. FIN. ECON. 278, 278 (2009).
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is that firms will employ strategies that are carefully tailored
to the consumers’ biases. They will exploit imperfect recall
of prices and will tailor their price framing such that in
equilibrium consumers’ problems in making accurate
judgements about price differences will come into play.199
We could expect to see similar outcomes in digital platform markets
because of the ease with which technology giants like Google,
Amazon, Facebook, and Apple possess total control over consumers’
interactions with, and perceptions of, their products and services.
b. Almost “Perfect” Switching
The notion that competition is “just a click away” in the online
world may further amplify digital platforms’ incentives to manipulate
consumers and generate lock-in.200 To be sure, although this strand of
argument has been disputed—that competition is almost perfect due to
consumers’ almost instantaneous ability to switch between
rivals 201—its prospect is still very real. In the search engine context,
for example, Edlin and Harris contend that “[a]cross search engines,
there are virtually zero transactions switching costs. . . . [U]sers not
only frequently switch search engines between search sessions, they
often switch during a search session.”202 Moreover, users can switch
199. HUCK ET AL., OFF. OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 197, at 43.
200. Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Google and the Limits of Antitrust: The Case Against the
Case Against Google, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 195 (2011); Rory Van Loo, Helping Buyers
Beware: The Need for Supervision of Big Retail, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 1319 (2015).
201. This mantra has been recited many times. See, e.g., Manne & Wright, supra note 200 (quoting
statistics from a website and concluding that “as Google so often asserts . . . competition really is ‘just a
click away’ for a significant number of users.”); Van Loo, supra note 200 (describing online shopping as
“consumer-friendly” where “comparison information is just a click away . . . .”); Robert H. Bork & J.
Gregory Sidak, What Does the Chicago School Teach About Internet Search and the Antitrust Treatment
of Google?, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 663, 665 (2012) (describing competition as just a click away);
Aaron S. Edlin & Robert G. Harris, The Role of Switching Costs in Antitrust Analysis: A Comparison of
Microsoft and Google, 15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 169, 176 (2013) (“Because of low switching costs, Google
search is vulnerable to existing competitors and new entrants to the market . . . .”); Robert H. Bork,
Opinion,
Antitrust
and
Google,
CHI.
TRIB.
(Apr.
6,
2012,
12:00
AM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/ct-xpm-2012-04-06-ct-perspec-0405-bork-20120406story.html [https://perma.cc/QJV4-EF2Z] (“Consumers can switch search engines without cost
instantaneously.”).
202. Edlin & Harris, supra note 201, at 196.
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back and forth between different search engines “costless[ly],” or in
other words, “‘switch-back costs’ are low.”203
Some studies do reveal high rates of switching at low cost between
search engines. Empirical evidence seems to bolster these claims. One
study, for example, found that users switch between search engines
“often”—both “within” and “between” search sessions. 204
Specifically,
of the 14.2 million users in [one study’s] log sample, 10.3 million
(72.6%) used more than one engine in the six-month duration of
the logs, 7.1 million (50.0%) switched engines within a search
session at least once, and 9.6 million (67.6%) used different search
engines for different sessions (i.e., engaged in between-session
switching).205

Further, 4.4% of the log sample left a search engine for another and
never returned to the former.206 Other studies found similar evidence
of easy and frequent switching. 207
Moreover, the fact that switching is “free” is yet another reason why
digital platforms should take the spectre of user switching very

203. Id.
204. Ryen W. White & Susan T. Dumais, Characterizing and Predicting Search Engine Switching
Behavior, in THE 18TH ACM CONFERENCE ON INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT 87, 87
(David Cheung, Il-Yeol Song, Wesley Chu, Xiaohua Hu, Jimmy Lin, Jiexun Li & Zhiyong Peng eds.,
2009).
205. Id. at 89.
206. Id.
207. Doug Downey, Susan Dumais & Eric Horvitz, Models of Searching and Browsing: Languages,
Studies, and Applications, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH INTERNATIONAL JOINT CONFERENCE ON
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 2740, 2747 (2007); Qi Guo, Ryen W. White, Yunqiao Zhang, Blake Anderson
& Susan T. Dumais, Why Searchers Switch: Understanding and Predicting Engine Switching Rationales,
in 1 SIGIR’11: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 34TH INTERNATIONAL ACM SIGIR CONFERENCE ON RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT IN INFORMATION RETRIEVAL 335, 335 (2011); Allison P. Heath & Ryen W. White,
Defection Detection: Predicting Search Engine Switching, in WWW’08: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 17TH
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WORLD WIDE WEB 1173, 1174 (2008) (“In the duration of the study,
approximately half of the users switched search engines at least once per month. Around 8% of search
sessions contained a search engine switch, a proportion which could have profound financial implications
given the large number of users involved.”).
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seriously,208 which may amplify their incentives to subtly manipulate
and cognitively lock in consumers.
c. Pernicious Self-Preferencing
A more nuanced reason as to why digital platforms may gravitate
towards more subtle forms of exclusion in the form of cognitive
foreclosure is that a more overt form of exclusion—that is, excluding
rivals on the intra-platform level—would not seem to be in a
platform’s interests. This is because platforms need to maintain their
perceived quality in the first instance and not act in ways that would
cause consumers to switch away. Otherwise put, platform markets are
two-sided markets and the demand by one side (say, advertisers) is
dependent upon the demand of the other (consumers). Examples
include shopping malls (an increase in shops increases consumer
demand) and computer hardware (a decrease in consumer demand
would lead software developers to produce less applications for that
hardware).209 In short, a platform is not incentivized to foreclose rival
applications from its platform because doing so will lower the
platform’s overall value; “[t]o the contrary . . . a platform monopolist
has an incentive to innovate and push for improvements in its
system—including better applications—in order to profit from a more
valuable platform.”210 A platform may even choose not to enter (or exit
if it is already present) downstream as a way of signaling its desire for

208. David S. Evans, Multisided Platforms, Dynamic Competition, and the Assessment of Market
Power for Internet-Based Firms 21–22 (Coase-Sandor Inst. for L. & Econ., Univ. of Chi. L. Sch., Working
Paper
No.
753,
2016),
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2468&context=law_and_economics
[https://perma.cc/8Q9P-E7SL] (“Since the platforms are free [consumers] can use as many as they want
and switch their attention depending upon the relative attractiveness to spending time on one or the
other.”).
209. Oz Shy, A Short Survey of Network Economics, 38 REV. INDUS. ORG. 119, 135–36 (2011)
(illustrating two-sided market theory through examples).
210. Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies:
Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 103
(2003).
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efficient applications competition to downstream application
developers.211
Google Android exemplifies this latter point and somewhat
discredits interventionists’ arguments that Google’s agreements with
original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) for the latter to pre-install
Google Search constitutes a tying violation. 212 “Tying occurs when a
seller conditions the sale of [one] product with market power on the
purchase of another product.”213 Market power in the tying product is
essential because, “[o]therwise, the buyer can simply purchase a
substitute for the tying product without the tied product.” 214 Thus,
Google Android is allegedly the tying product with market power and
Google Search is the tied product, which Google supposedly forces
OEMs to pre-install.
But the two-sided nature of Google Android illuminates the fallacy
of this tying theory because Google has an incentive not to exclude
complementary applications.215 Google is not incentivized to exclude
competing search applications because the value of its Google Android
mobile operating system would decrease for consumers—who “have
demand for unlimited applications”216—which in turn would decrease
their demand. Application developers, who “want the most consumers
to use their applications,”217 would consequently reduce their supply
of apps for Android (because they would not produce apps for a mobile
operating system that few consumers demand). 218 OEMs, in turn,
would switch away from Android towards operating systems that app

211. Id. at 103–04 (“Platform providers may . . . stay out of (or exit from) [downstream] applications
market[s] . . . as a means of ensuring efficient competition in that market . . . . [and] be a good steward of
the applications sector for its platform . . . .”).
212. Bork & Sidak, supra note 201, at 698.
213. Id. at 698–99.
214. Id. at 699.
215. See Farrell & Weiser, supra note 210, at 100 (“[P]latform providers who integrate into applications
development often take pains ‘not to compete with customers’ so as to minimize any ill effects of
integration on independent applications.”).
216. Bork & Sidak, supra note 201, at 699.
217. Id.
218. Id. (“If Google were to exclude applications from Android . . . , it would reduce consumer choice
and degrade the quality of Android. Consumers would lose demand for Android. As a result, developers
of new applications would begin to supply their applications on a different platform.”).
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developers switch to. 219 “OEMs would . . . produce fewer Android
devices[,] . . . [which] would reduce Google’s firm value.”220
From a more nuanced perspective, however, it may be argued that
this “complementary demand” between consumers and app developers
does not so much as disincentivize Google from foreclosing
applications on Android, as some scholars maintain; 221 rather, it
simply reduces the total amount of ways a platform should foreclose
competition. Otherwise put, in a scenario where a platform is also a
rival on its own platform, the incentive to self-preference still remains,
but the methods a platform chooses in this regard would have to be
much more subtle than simply not allowing rivals onto its platform
because, as the above analysis has shown, a platform has incentives to
make its platform as open as possible so as to maximize consumer
demand. Thus, a platform will have incentives to exclude in much
more subtle ways—one of which may be to take advantage of
consumers’ cognitive shortcomings and generate foreclosure from the
demand-side.
Indeed, the Commission’s reasoning in Google Android222 and the
more recent U.S. DOJ Google case 223 would seem to attest to this
narrative given that the theories adopted in these cases are grounded
on BE. Comments about the “abnormal[]” nature of such
self-preferencing conduct in Google Search (Shopping) are also
vindicating in this respect because they highlight the court’s confusion
about Google—a platform subject to network effects—engaging in

219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 699–700; see also Farrell & Weiser, supra note 210, at 101 (“[I]n choosing how to . . . deal
with developers, [a monopoly] firm has a clear incentive to choose the pattern that will best provide it or
its customers with applications.”).
222. Commission Decision C(2018) 4761 of July 18, 2018, Case AT.40099 Google Android ¶¶ 2-3
[hereinafter
Google
Android],
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/40099/40099_9993_3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W2Q4-BQZ5], appeal filed sub nom. Case T-604/18, Google & Alphabet v. Comm’n
(Google Android) (Nov. 23, 2018).
223. Press Release, Off. of Pub. Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Sues Monopolist Google
for Violating Antitrust Laws, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-sues-monopolistgoogle-violating-antitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/55KH-4S69] (Oct. 20, 2020).
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ostensibly self-defeating behavior.224 The traditional strand of debate
about a platform’s interrelated demand and how this cuts against
exclusionary incentives, therefore, may need to be reconceived: it is
not that the platform does not have incentives to exclude (these still
exist) but rather the method through which the platform excludes will
need to be more subtle and manipulative—perhaps in the pernicious
form of self-preferencing—given that its total value as a platform
correlates with the number of options that platform provides to users
(in other words, in the form of applications like different search
engines or in the form of sellers in an online marketplace).
In sum, digital platform markets seem to be manifesting as
structurally unique business models that can empower platforms to
manipulate consumers on a scale that is simultaneously powerful and
pernicious. The “digital firehose of information” 225 —which may
induce greater consumer reliance on heuristics and biases due to
information overload—coupled with amplified abilities and incentives
to manipulate presents a newly emerging phenomenon whereby firms
are uniquely positioned to cognitively foreclose competition. The
basic takeaway is that, rather than competing on the merits or via
“superior skill, foresight and industry,”226 digital platform firms seem
uniquely positioned to leverage their market power 227 in behaviorally
manipulative ways and “keep competition at bay.” 228 What these
behaviorally manipulative methods could look like is now examined.
III. BEHAVIORAL FRUSTRATION OF CONSUMER SWITCHING AT

224. See Case T-612/17 Google LLC & Alphabet, Inc. v. Comm’n (Google Shopping),
ECLI:EU:T:2021:763, ¶¶ 176, 178-179 (Nov. 10, 2021), appeal filed, Case C-48/22 P (Jan. 20, 2022).
225. Newman, supra note 130, at 748.
226. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
227. Note that the leverage in this regard is different from traditional leverage theories where, for
example, in the case of tying, a firm may use its high market share in one market to gain a competitive
advantage in another complementary product market. For cognitive foreclosure purposes, the leverage
would be with respect to dominant digital platforms’ access to voluminous personal data, which may be
relied upon to manipulate.
228. Cheng, supra note 96, at 3–4.
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INTER- AND INTRA-PLATFORM LEVELS
Hanson and Kysar described manipulation susceptibility due to
cognitive biases as “the single most significant implication to be drawn
from behavioral research.” 229 As noted at the previous Section’s
outset, the potential for digital platform firms to manipulate consumer
behavioral biases and “shape demand” is starting to be recognized
across scholarship and regulation, and the foregoing Section
demonstrated this emerging phenomenon as a more pernicious form of
foreclosure that deserves to be taken seriously.230 Indeed, controlled
experimental studies have already documented instances where, for
example, manipulative partitioned or price-dripping strategies, which
take advantage of a consumer’s bounded rationality, may have induced
a consumer to purchase in erroneous or welfare-reducing ways.231
This emerging form of potentially anticompetitive conduct—one
with powerful capacities in the online world, as shown above—clearly
has implications for antitrust enforcement if, for example, the position
229. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 127, at 722. Note, however, that Hanson and Kysar’s analysis was in
the context of products liability law. Id.
230. See supra Parts II.A, II.B, II.B.2.c.
231. COMPETITION & MKTS. AUTH., supra note 124. For experimental work, see CHARLOTTE DUKE,
MIRIAM SINN, STEFFEN HUCK & BRIAN WALLACE, OFF. OF FAIR TRADING, OFT1501A, PARTITIONED
PRICING
RESEARCH:
A
BEHAVIOURAL
EXPERIMENT
(2013)
(U.K.),
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20140402142426/http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/e
conomic_research/OFT1501A.pdf, where the study found:
[T]he way prices are framed does matter for consumer decision making and
welfare. In particular, we find evidence that consumers reduce search effort under
most price frames we investigate and that under some of the price frames they also
make more mistakes in search and purchasing behaviour as compared to straight
unit pricing . . . .
Id. at 9; Shelle Santana, Steven K. Dallas & Vicki G. Morwitz, Consumer Reactions to Drip Pricing, 39
MKTG. SCI. 188, 188 (2020) (“Across six studies, . . . when optional surcharges are dripped (versus
revealed up front) consumers are more likely to initially select a lower base priced option which, after
surcharges are included, is often more expensive than the alternative.”); and Steffen Huck & Brian
Wallace, The Impact of Price Frames on Consumer Decision Making: Experimental Evidence 1 (Oct. 15,
2015) (unpublished manuscript) (U.K.), https://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctpbwa/papers/price-framing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RZ6V-GQLH], where the authors found that “all frames deviating from the [linear]
benchmark have some negative impact on consumer decision making. The most striking result concerns
drip pricing . . . . [which extinguished] 22% of consumer surplus.” For more evaluative accounts, see
Gorkan Ahmetoglu, Adrian Furnham & Patrick Fagan, Pricing Practices: A Critical Review of Their
Effects on Consumer Perceptions and Behaviour, 21 J. RETAILING & CONSUMER SERVS. 696, 696 (2014),
where “[o]verall, the current review indicates that sellers are able to influence perceptions and purchase
decisions of consumers based on the manner in which prices are displayed.”
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of a search result; the framing of price, quality, and website attributes;
the introduction of irrelevant third options; or misrepresenting the
previous demand for a product (that is, taking advantage of the
“bandwagon” effect)232 can induce a consumer to purchase when they
otherwise would not. The realization of alternative substitutes
becomes foreclosed, and competition intensity becomes softened, with
the result being a potential solidifying of market power. These latter
phenomena, coupled with significantly increased abilities to
manipulate a consumer’s willingness to pay, may be moving us closer
to not only a world where competition no longer can just be
anticompetitively foreclosed through more explicit means, like
refusals to deal or license, but also through a much subtler, much more
pernicious method that cognitively forecloses competition.
This new form of potentially “bad conduct”—a prerequisite for
showing a unilateral antitrust infringement233—may be the most potent
form of nefarious exclusion in a world that is “increasingly structured
by information technology . . . [and] removed from view—a world of
screens people look through.”234 Indeed, “[a] determined manipulator
could not dream up a better infrastructure through which to carry out
his plans.”235 This Section thus demonstrates the various ways digital
platform firms could manipulate cognitive biases to maintain market
power by frustrating a consumer’s incentive and ability to switch. The
Section therefore seeks to reveal the methods through which this can
be achieved—that is, the specific bias being manipulated and how it
may be leveraged to “prolong[]” monopoly power.236
The analysis is undertaken at two distinct levels—on the
inter-platform level and intra-platform level. The reasons for
232. Colangelo & Maggiolino, supra note 30, at 89–90 (“[A]n advertiser, knowing that a consumer is
very keen to buy skis and prone to being influenced by someone else’s choices (bandwagon bias), might
market that consumer a brand of skis by stressing that the vast majority of clients favored it over others
in order to persuade him/her to purchase it.”).
233. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE § 6.3, at 356 (LEG, Inc. d/b/a West Academic 6th ed. 2020) (“[I]llegal monopolization still
requires monopoly power plus some form of anticompetitive conduct.”).
234. Susser et al., Online Manipulation, supra note 127, at 34.
235. Id.
236. HOVENKAMP, supra note 233, § 6.4a, at 358. This concept of foreclosure is widely shared. See,
e.g., id. at 358–59.
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demarcating the analysis like this are twofold: the first is that, as noted
previously, digital platform markets are replicating the aforementioned
concerns about private-label brands and the conflicts of interest that
such dynamics can generate, which provides a justification for the
intra-platform demarcation where a platform may be incentivized to
self-preference. Indeed, platforms can “create private-label brands”237
for downstream applications, which contrasts with pre-2005 market
realities where search engines, for instance, did not create their own
content or services outside of a search functionality. 238 But today’s
market realities look very different where platforms generate their own
brand content like “Maps” or “comparison-shopping services,” which
then get baked into general search results but displayed more saliently.
Enforcement actions to date have largely percolated around these
concerns of self-preferencing and own-content bias—several of which
are underpinned with BE-orientated theories of harm—rather than the
upstream inter-platform effects.
Indeed, the recent Google Search (Shopping) 239 judgment held
self-preferencing to be abusively anticompetitive because Google
positioned its own comparison-shopping service over competitors
more favorably and vividly, which through the lens of BE takes
advantage of consumer inertia and salience effects. The long-awaited
judgment therefore exemplifies on its own accord the potential
significance of self-preferencing as an important behavioral theory of
harm for antitrust agencies and courts moving forward.

237. Cheng, supra note 96, at 22.
238. Marina Lao, “Neutral” Search as a Basis for Antitrust Action?, HARV. J.L. & TECH. OCCASIONAL
PAPER SERIES 1, 10 (2013) (“Prior to 2005, the lines between search and web content were clear. The role
of general search engines, which then did not create web content or provide other services, was simply to
generate a list of the most useful websites—the ‘ten blue links’—in response to search queries.”); see also
INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS, supra note 26, at 282 (discussing Amazon and
how “[b]y virtue of its role as an intermediary in the marketplace, Amazon can give itself favorable
treatment relative to competing sellers”).
239. See Case T-612/17 Google LLC & Alphabet, Inc. v. Comm’n (Google Shopping),
ECLI:EU:T:2021:763, ¶¶ 182-185 (Nov. 10, 2021), appeal filed, Case C-48/22 P (Jan. 20, 2022); see also
General Court of the European Union Press Release No. 197/21, The General Court Largely Dismisses
Google’s Action Against the Decision of the Commission Finding that Google Abused Its Dominant
Position by Favouring Its Own Comparison Shopping Service over Competing Comparison Shopping
Services
(Nov.
10,
2021),
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/202111/cp210197en.pdf [https://perma.cc/K32U-BWW6] (discussing the General Court’s decision).
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The second reason that supplies a justification for inter-platform
foreclosure analysis is that inter-platform competition is still a
significant issue in a market that is dominated by just a few large tech
companies who hold very large shares of their respective markets and
where the prospect of new entry has been cast in doubt by various
regulatory and policy reports in 2019 in particular. 240 Indeed, if
cognitive foreclosure is a real spectre, then the intensity of
inter-platform competition is just as in doubt as intra-platform
competition given the necessity of prospective platform entrants to
gain a critical mass of users by prompting them to switch en masse.
This is because of the now well-established proposition that
competition in platform contexts is “for” the market.241
The suggestion, of course, is not that behavioral manipulation is the
only source of foreclosure. Rather, it may serve to solidify and
entrench market power that is already present due to other
environmental factors like network effects and data access issues.242

240. See Stigler Antitrust Subcommittee Report, supra note 26, at 81; DIGIT. COMPETITION EXPERT
PANEL, supra note 26, at 17; CRÉMER ET AL., EUR. COMM’N, supra note 27, at 8; see also INVESTIGATION
OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS, supra note 26, at 40.
241. CRÉMER ET AL., EUR. COMM’N, supra note 27, at 23. A platform’s value to any given user and
advertiser increases as total users increase (in other words, direct and indirect network effects). Thus, the
fact that users will migrate to (and stay on) a platform with the majority of users demonstrates why in
these kinds of markets there will ever only be a “place for [just] a limited number of platforms.” Id. at 55.
242. For network effects, see AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM’N, supra note 27, at 73;
and Stigler Antitrust Subcommittee Report, supra note 26, at 38–39. See also Joseph Farrell & Paul
Klemperer, Coordination and Lock-in: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects, in 3
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1967, 2007 (Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter eds., 2007),
where the authors describe how network effects exist when “one agent’s adoption of a good (a) benefits
other adopters of the good . . . and (b) increases others’ incentives to adopt it.”; and id. at 2022 (emphasis
added), where “the fact that adoption encourages others to adopt the same network . . . . [means a] user’s
adoption of A instead of B not only directly makes A more attractive to others but also makes the
alternative, B, less so.” For data access, see Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Michal S. Gal, Access Barriers to Big
Data, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 339, 342 (2017), where “[t]hose who enjoy more portholes from which to gather
data, who have a substantial database to which they can compare new data, or who possess unique data
synthesis and analysis tools, may enjoy a competitive comparative advantage.”
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A. Scrambling Switching Incentives
1. Framing Effects
Framing effects in BE have come to be known for the proposition
that “context matters in decision[-]making.”243 In contrast to rational
choice theory, which says that the way a choice is framed should not
affect the choice outcome, experimental studies have showcased
anomalous deviations illustrating that, in fact, the way a choice is
framed can affect choice outcomes.244 In short, an actor’s preferences
between, say, A and B should be “invariant” to the way in which A and
B are presented245 (provided the actual outcome of A and the actual
outcome of B remain the same).
This proposition—that consumer preferences can be shaped and
manipulated 246 —may have potential implications for antitrust
foreclosure analysis in the context of digital platforms where the
platform has continuous and ubiquitous control over user interfaces
and the information therein. The implications may be twofold: (1) a
platform may be endowed with the capacity to frustrate switching
incentives to a rival platform and retain user attention, which is the

243. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 14, at 1103.
244. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,
211 SCIENCE 453, 453 (1981); Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economic Analysis of Redistributive Legal
Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1669 (1998) (noting that “[s]tandard economic theory predicts no
difference between” the outcomes in Kahneman and Tversky’s theatre ticket example). In the theater
ticket example, Tversky and Kahneman asked respondents to consider two scenarios: (1) They are
traveling to a play where tickets cost $10 and, on the way, realize that they have lost $10 from their wallet.
Would they still purchase the ticket? (2) They are traveling to a play and realize they have lost the ticket,
which costs $10. Would they purchase another ticket? Id. Standard economic theory predicts respondents
will answer both scenarios identically—comparing the marginal benefit of attending with the marginal
cost. Kahneman and Tversky find that in contradiction to rational choice theory—which “requires that the
preference between options should not reverse with changes of frame”—in this demonstration and several
others “seemingly inconsequential changes in the formulation of choice problems caused significant shifts
of preference.” Tversky & Kahneman, supra, at 453, 457.
245. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 14, at 1103.
246. See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Shopping Badly: Cognitive Biases, Communications, and the
Fallacy of the Marketplace of Ideas, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 649, 698 (2006) (“The point is not merely that
we evaluate the same purchase, or its monetary equivalent, differently depending on context. It is also that
we’re vulnerable to strategic behavior by those with influence over our information environment.”).
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scarce commodity that all the fighting is about in the online world 247
(inter-platform competition); and (2) a platform may be able to
frustrate switching to a rival that competes on the platform when the
platform is vertically integrated (intra-platform competition).
a. Emotional Losses
Inter-platform: One framing method through which a platform
could render consumers “sticky” and thus degrade the intensity of
rivalry between platforms is to frame the “platform exit” as a loss that
cannot be recovered by switching to a new platform. 248 This takes
advantage of one of the most established behavioral biases: loss
aversion. This bias proposes that humans tend towards feeling the pain
of a loss much more than they feel the pleasure of a gain. 249 For
instance, +$100 may be accorded less value than –$100.250
Consider, for example, a social networking platform like Facebook.
Such a platform could highlight the friends whom a user will lose
contact with if they exit the platform 251 or the secret chat groups they
were part of, with one user describing such tactics as “a pure
masterclass in emotional manipulation.” 252 Additional losses might
include friends’ birthday reminders (thus, the emotional pleasure of
wishing a friend “happy birthday”), music concerts that a user will not
247. TIM WU, THE ATTENTION MERCHANTS: THE EPIC SCRAMBLE TO GET INSIDE OUR HEADS 6
(2016); see also Newman, supra note 130, at 762; Evans, supra note 131; Day & Stemler, supra note 37,
at 8 (“[A] platform’s success depends on its ability to draw and maintain attention.”).
248. Complaint at 3, United States v. Google LLC, No. 20-cv-03010 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 10, 2020).
249. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47
ECONOMETRICA 263, 263 (1979) (“The value function [of prospect theory] is normally concave for gains,
commonly convex for losses, and is generally steeper for losses than for gains.”); Kahneman et al., supra
note 4, at 199 (describing how a “central result [of the risky choice studies] is that changes that make
things worse (losses) loom larger than improvements or gains.”).
250. Nicholas C. Barberis, Thirty Years of Prospect Theory in Economics: A Review and Assessment,
27 J. ECON. PERSPS. 173, 175 (2013) (“[T]he horizontal axis represents the dollar gain or loss x, and the
vertical axis [represents] the value v(x) assigned to that gain or loss. Notice that the value placed on a $100
gain, v(100), is smaller in absolute magnitude than v(-100), the value placed on a $100 loss. . . . [T]he
pain of losing $100 far outweighs the pleasure of winning $110.”).
251. One user reported that she was met by the message: “Not so fast”[!] . . . Look who you will miss
out on keeping in touch with . . . .” Tanya Sweeney, Thinking of Leaving Facebook? Not So Fast . . . ,
IRISH TIMES, https://www.irishtimes.com/life-and-style/people/thinking-of-leaving-facebook-not-sofast-1.3433938 [https://perma.cc/9CMC-3UNK] (Mar. 20, 2018, 4:58 PM).
252. Id.
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be reminded of (thus, the user may miss out on), the uploaded photos
of nights out with friends—along with the ensuing thread of comments
full of jokes, laugh emojis, and heart emojis that signal everybody’s
enjoyment with those nights out.
In short, a social networking site like Facebook “and its ilk [may be]
as close to a community as many of us are likely to get.”253 Nefariously
highlighting all of this on the “exit” page could thread on a user’s
incentive to leave the platform and manipulate them into staying at the
exact point in time that they are about to exert their competitive
constraint. The emotional sting of having to incur all of the above
“losses” may prove too overwhelming and render the user “sticky.”254
Indeed, recent research has highlighted the primordial role of FOMO
(Fear Of Missing Out) in perpetuating social media use,255 defined as
“a pervasive apprehension that others might be having rewarding
experiences from which one is absent.” 256 FOMO is therefore “the
desire to stay continually connected with what others are doing.”257
Some research links FOMO to social media addiction.258
As a consequence, Facebook becoming so culturally embedded into
our lives may mean that recent #DeleteFacebook campaigns arguably
fail “to take into account both Facebook’s position in modern society
and the stakes involved for anyone who chooses to leave a network that
has spent more than a decade trying to make leaving it impossible.”259
253. Id.
254. Complaint at 3, United States v. Google LLC, No. 20-cv-03010 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 10, 2020).
255. Kuss & Griffiths, supra note 192, at 8 (“Recent research has suggested that high engagement in
social networking is partially due to what has been named the ‘fear of missing out’ (FOMO).” (footnote
omitted)); see generally Ursula Oberst, Elisa Wegmann, Benjamin Stodt, Matthias Brand & Andrés
Chamarro, Negative Consequences from Heavy Social Networking in Adolescents: The Mediating Role of
Fear of Missing Out, 55 J. ADOLESCENCE 51 (2017) (discussing FOMO and social media sites); Sarah L.
Buglass, Jens F. Binder, Lucy R. Betts & Jean D.M. Underwood, Motivators of Online Vulnerability: The
Impact of Social Network Site Use and FOMO, 66 COMPUTS. HUM. BEHAV. 248 (2017) (discussing how
FOMO affects people’s wellbeing while performing online activities).
256. Andrew K. Przybylski, Kou Murayama, Cody R. DeHaan & Valerie Gladwell, Motivational,
Emotional, and Behavioral Correlates of Fear of Missing Out, 29 COMPUTS. HUM. BEHAV. 1841, 1841
(2013).
257. Id. (emphasis added).
258. See, e.g., Jamal Al-Menayes, The Fear of Missing Out Scale: Validation of the Arabic Version and
Correlation with Social Media Addiction, 6 INT’L J. APPLIED PSYCH. 41, 45 (2016).
259. Aja Romano, How Facebook Made It Impossible to Delete Facebook, VOX (emphasis added),
https://www.vox.com/culture/2018/3/22/17146776/delete-facebook-how-to-quit-difficult
[https://perma.cc/5BJR-5AGZ] (Dec. 20, 2018, 12:36 PM).
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For instance, many third-party apps and websites actually require you
to have a Facebook account, meaning that in deleting Facebook “you
could immediately lose access to some parts of the [I]nternet.”260 One
of the most emotional aspects of our lives—dating and mating—is
noteworthy because many online dating apps (including Tinder until
recently) actually required a Facebook account for their use. 261 Google
is similar given that it “arguably shares much of the [I]nternet’s
infrastructure with Facebook.”262 As such, a platform could highlight
a potential plethora of emotional losses to take advantage of loss
aversion and deter switching away from its service.
b. Willingness to Pay as a Function of Switching Incentives
A consumer’s willingness to purchase is the maximum amount a
consumer would be willing to pay for a good or service and can be
manipulated through framing effects. Consider two goods, Product X
and Product Y. Both are perfectly substitutable, but the former costs $5
and the latter costs $4. Assume also that the most the consumer is
willing to pay for this particular product is $5, at which point (or rather,
slightly above this point) the consumer is no longer willing to purchase
Product X and will seek out cheaper alternatives like Product Y.
Otherwise put, the consumer’s incentive to switch—that is, the
substitution effect—becomes triggered exactly at the point the
consumer sees a product they desire but which is priced at more than
their willingness to pay, thus rendering the former a result of the latter.
The fact that this willingness to pay can be shaped, distorted, and
manipulated—that is, a firm may be able to “elevate consumer
willingness to pay by manipulating the view that consumers have of a
product’s benefits”263 and price—will now be illuminated.

260. Id.
261. Id. (“[M]any . . . dating apps still require you to have Facebook in order to create accounts. If you
don’t realize that before you delete Facebook, you could be totally cut off from anyone you may have met
through these apps.”).
262. Id.
263. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 127, at 725 (positing that manufacturers may be able to mold a
consumer’s willingness to pay and, consequently, induce “undesirable levels of consumption”).
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Intra-platform: An incumbent firm like Amazon is illustrative.
Amazon is both a marketplace and a competitor in that marketplace.
“Amazon owns over 100 private[-]label brands that operate in dozens
of markets on its site, including food and beverage, automotive,
clothing, and electronics.”264 In light of the pernicious self-preference
incentives highlighted above, 265 Amazon may possess inclinations to
frame their prices and terms in ways that, “to a rational actor, would
correspond with a monopoly price, but that appear competitive to
consumers whose supply of relevant information is constrained by
bounded rationality.” 266 As such, a consumer’s incentive to switch
may remain dormant as they become cognitively manipulated towards
potentially “undesirable levels of consumption”267 of one brand at the
expense of rivals.
Indeed, the phenomena of partition or drip pricing—where price is
framed fragmentarily and porously rather than collectively and
solidly—are classic examples of tactics that can render switching
incentives dormant because they can cause us “to behave as if [a
product’s] price is lower than it is.”268 Likewise, the phenomenon of
anchoring269 can similarly influence a consumer’s willingness to pay
(or more worryingly a judge’s willingness to sentence, leading them to
“unintentionally play dice with criminal sentences”). 270 A
264. Kevin Lamb, The Complete Guide to Amazon’s Private Label Brands, PATTERN,
https://pattern.com/blog/all-you-need-to-know-about-amazons-private-label-brands/
[https://perma.cc/6BDG-5K6F] (July 2, 2021).
265. See supra Part II.B.2.c.
266. Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 13, at 1028.
267. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 127, at 725.
268. MARY W. SULLIVAN, FTC, ECONOMIC ISSUES: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF HOTEL RESORT FEES 20
(2017) (emphasis added), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/economic-analysis-hotelresort-fees/p115503_hotel_resort_fees_economic_issues_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/TN6T-J25H].
269. Daniel Kahneman, Reference Points, Anchors, Norms, and Mixed Feelings, 51 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 296, 308 (1992) (explaining anchoring effects as “cases in which
a stimulus or a message that is clearly designated as irrelevant and uninformative nevertheless increases
the normality of a possible outcome”).
270. Birte Englich, Thomas Mussweiler & Fritz Strack, Playing Dice with Criminal Sentences: The
Influence of Irrelevant Anchors on Experts’ Judicial Decision Making, 32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH.
BULL. 188, 199 (2006). In this experiment, forty-two experienced judges and prosecutors were asked
whether in a hypothetical rape case the sentence would be lower than one year or lower than three years
(low and high anchors, respectively). Id. at 190–91. Subjects who had been exposed to the high anchor
“gave considerably higher sentences” (mean = 33.38 months) than subjects exposed to the low anchor
(mean = 25.43 months). Id. at 191.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol38/iss4/9

56

O'Loughlin: Cognitive Foreclosure

2022]

COGNITIVE FORECLOSURE

1153

demonstrative example of how incentives to switch may remain
dormant because prices “[seem] lower than [they] actually [are]” can
be found in Las Vegas casino resorts. 271 For example, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) found that when booking the Luxe Resort
& Casino through an Online Travel Agent (OTA), resort fee
disclosures were excluded from the first page that consumers see (the
hotel comparison page), and the FTC described this as “a significant
omission because consumers use this page to comparison shop.” 272
When the resort fee is disclosed for the first time, it is partitioned
“separately” from the hotel room rate and is “in a smaller, paler font
than the room rate.”273 The FTC also identified several other instances
of framing, dripping, and partitioning resort fees, like stating “Hotel
Fee Not Included” beside the room rate and positioning it much further
down the screen, or requiring clicking on a hyperlink before revealing
the resort fee, which even then was listed at the bottom of “a
day-by-day itemization of room charges.”274 Although some models
suggest no consumer harm would result from framing prices in
“dripped” or “partitioned” ways, they are based on the assumption of
rationality and several models suggest the opposite. 275
Two pernicious methods of price framing—price ordering and
product-line pricing—could be used to capitalize on a consumer’s
bounded rationality, distort their perceptions of product value, and,

271. Mary Sullivan, Economist, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at a Conference on the Economics of
Drip
Pricing
120
(May
21,
2012),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/economics-drip-pricing/transcript.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UY7K-CK8G]; see also Stucke & Ezrachi, supra note 136, at 78–87 (discussing tactics
that Las Vegas casinos use in their pricing models).
272. SULLIVAN, FTC, supra note 268, at 6–7.
273. Id. at 7.
274. Id. at 7–8.
275. Sullivan, supra note 271, at 8, 9; see Glenn Ellison & Sara Fisher Ellison, Search, Obfuscation,
and Price Elasticities on the Internet, 77 ECONOMETRICA 427, 438 (2009); Xavier Gabaix & David
Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets,
121 Q.J. ECON. 505, 510 (2006) (finding that in some instances firms will “shroud” price information to
take advantage of myopic consumers); cf. Paul R. Milgrom, Good News and Bad News: Representation
Theorems and Applications, 12 BELL J. ECON. 380 (1981) (finding similar reasoning for favorable news
in different contexts); Sanford J. Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure
About Product Quality, 24 J.L. & ECON. 461 (1981) (using a similar model for disclosures of sellers in
warranty contracts).
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consequently, manipulate their willingness to pay. 276 As to price
ordering, a platform interested in self-preference may present their
prices and terms in descending order (from highest to lowest), which,
according to one study, will elevate the consumer’s willingness to
pay. 277 For example, the aforementioned study demonstrated that
when pen prices were shown in descending order (highest to lowest),
subjects exhibited higher reservation prices and purchased more pens
compared to the subjects who were exposed to the prices in ascending
order.278 The former subjects were also more likely to have perceived
their “final purchase price [as] good value.”279 Regarding product-line
pricing, it has been shown that the introduction of a higher-priced
product amongst two other products can increase a consumer’s
willingness to pay because it makes “the remaining products in the line
appear less expensive.” 280 For example, one study of microwave
brands comprising Emerson and Panasonic found that when the
product-line pricing was changed from “Emerson and Panasonic I” to
“Emerson, Panasonic I, and Panasonic II” (a premium-priced
microwave), this “had a significant effect on choices.”281 Specifically,
Panasonic’s share increased from 43% to 73%.282 More notably, the
introduction of the premium-priced model significantly increased sales
of Panasonic I and, moreover, Emerson lost 30% market share.283
Such manipulative strategies could empower a self-preferencing
firm to enhance “buyers’ perceptions of lower-priced products” and,
more significantly, influence “low-end buyers to trade up to
higher-priced models.” 284 As such, willingness to pay becomes
manipulated, inducing a consumer to purchase a higher-priced product

276. Gerald E. Smith & Thomas T. Nagle, Frames of Reference and Buyers’ Perception of Price and
Value, CAL. MGMT. REV., Fall 1995, at 98, 98 (describing how “framing” research has illuminated the
potential to influence consumer perceptions of what they “perceive” they will pay and what they
“perceive” they will get in return).
277. Id. at 106.
278. Id. at 105 tbl.1, 106.
279. Id. at 106.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 106–07.
282. Smith & Nagle, supra note 276, at 107.
283. Id.
284. Id.
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when they otherwise would have purchased a cheaper alternative. 285
Consumer choice can therefore be a product of behavioral
manipulation where incentives to switch become distorted; consumers
purchase when they otherwise would have switched, and real
competition becomes diluted. This may be particularly true in
intra-platform online contexts where platforms possess magnified
abilities to “increase the likelihood of purchase by carefully
controlling the context in which the purchase [price] is presented,”286
with the result being a vertically-integrated retailer like Amazon
“tilt[ing] the online marketplace in its own favor.”287
B. Stifling Switching Abilities
1. Willpower and Rationality as a Function of Switching Abilities
The fact that economic actors are bounded in their willpower is a
cornerstone of BE.288 For instance, smokers may prefer not to smoke
but struggle to quit despite such an action being in their long-term
interests. Unsafe sex also exemplifies our weaknesses as human
beings—one may realize ex ante that protected sex will be safer but in
the “heat of the moment” fall prey to visceral urges.289 We also suffer
from inertia and may fail to make optimal decisions and stick with
defaults when changing the default would improve our welfare. 290
285. Id. (“[L]ow-end sellers should be just as concerned with competitive entry at premium-price
positions as they are with threats from potential discount competitors. Why? Because the addition of new
premium products raises buyers’ reference prices, making mid-price positions more acceptable. Indeed,
buyers may now become suspicious of the quality of low-end products. They may reason that they cannot
afford premium-priced models, but are not willing to risk getting poor quality at the low end. They . . . thus
opt for mid-priced products instead.”).
286. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 127, at 734 (emphasis added); see also supra Part II.B.1.
287. Mary Hanbury, Elizabeth Warren Doubles Down on Amazon for ‘Crushing’ Small Businesses,
INSIDER (Apr. 24, 2019, 6:29 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/elizabeth-warren-slams-amazonfor-crushing-small-businesses-2019-4?r=US&IR=T [https://perma.cc/8VDW-BB25].
288. See Jolls et al., supra note 7, at 1479 (“[Bounded willpower] refers to the fact that human beings
often take actions that they know to be in conflict with their own long-term interests.”).
289. George Loewenstein, Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior, 65 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 272, 286 (1996).
290. Christopher J. Anderson, The Psychology of Doing Nothing: Forms of Decision Avoidance Result
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Bounded willpower, then, can be conceived of in two distinct ways:
addiction and lethargy. This bifurcated conception is pertinent for
illuminating how platforms can leverage these insights to foreclose
competition at both the inter-platform level (addiction) and
intra-platform level (inertia).
Although addiction-induced behavior has not made inroads into
antitrust analysis to date, we are about to see how it can amount to a
perniciously powerful mode of foreclosure at the inter-platform
level—the power of inertia has been demonstrated in Google Search
(Shopping) 291 and Google (Android) 292 as well as the seminal
Microsoft case.293 In these cases, the intra-platform foreclosure effect
can be said to have manifested because of consumer inertia. For
example, in Google Search (Shopping), the Commission essentially
held that positioning a search result on page four of Google Search will
disadvantage that result vis-à-vis other results because, as per the
evidence, “consumers click far more often on results that are more
visible, [that is,] the results appearing higher up in Google’s search
results.”294 References to lethargic consumers were even more explicit
in the theories of harm in Google Android 295 and Microsoft. 296 The
main takeaway from these cases is that consumer willpower is finite
and, consequently, capacities to switch can be products of this
willpower. Thus, “[t]he online market setting . . . highlights important

from Reason and Emotion, 129 PSYCH. BULL. 139, 140 (2003) (“[H]umans generally prefer no
change . . . , no action . . . , and delay . . . .” (citations omitted)). See generally William Samuelson &
Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988) (status quo
bias); Orit E. Tykocinski, Thane S. Pittman & Erin E. Tuttle, Inaction Inertia: Foregoing Future Benefits
as a Result of an Initial Failure to Act, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 793 (1995) (inertia).
291. See generally Google Search (Shopping), supra note 110.
292. See generally Google Android, supra note 222.
293. See generally Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601.
294. European Commission Press Release IP/17/1784, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google €2.42
Billion for Abusing Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage to Own Comparison
Shopping Service (June 27, 2017), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_17_1784
[https://perma.cc/62XZ-W7DY].
295. Google Android, supra note 222, ¶¶ 781-782 (“Users are unlikely to look for, download, and use
alternative apps, at least when the app that is pre-installed, premium placed and/or set as default already
delivers the required functionality to a satisfactory level.”); see also id. ¶¶ 900-909 (demonstrating
through evidence the significance of the default option on diluting consumers’ capacities to switch for
browser pre-installation).
296. Microsoft, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶ 1052.
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questions about when firms are no[t] competing on the basis of their
‘superior skill, foresight and industry,’ but instead [are] using their
market power to leverage consumer inertia and foreclose their
competitors.”297
Bounded rationality, of course, is another key tenet of BE with its
contradictions of rational choice theory. There is familiarity with how
(im)perfect rationality can influence switching analysis and, therefore,
inferences about market power in both Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Services, Inc. and Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2
v. Hyde.298 That consumer rationality is, therefore, bounded—that is,
(im)perfect—raises the spectre of such cognitive limitations being
manipulated, as regulators are more and more acknowledging.299
2. Perpetuating Addiction-Induced Attention
Inter-platform: As noted above, attention is a platform’s
lifeblood.300 Advertisers pay more for attention the more users provide
attention—that is, “[t]he value of advertising increases in concert with
the number of users engaged on the platform as well as time spent on
it.”301 We thus concluded that platforms possess very strong incentives
to catch, maintain, and retain a user’s attention.
Let us now examine some of the pernicious methods that platforms
use to achieve attention-retention that may leave users trapped in a
self-perpetuating cycle of addiction, which could prevent their
attention from wandering to other platform rivals. As Day and Stemler
note: “[K]ey to attracting and maintaining attention is the
297. Cheng, supra note 96.
298. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 469–78 (1992); Jefferson Par. Hosp.
Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9, 11–15 (1984), superseded by statute on other grounds, Act of Nov.
19, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-703, 102 Stat. 4674, as recognized in Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc.,
547 U.S. 28 (2006), and abrogated by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
299. See supra Part II; see also HUCK ET AL., OFF. OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 197, at 7
(“[C]onsumers that have difficulties judging quality can mistake inferior goods for superior goods. In
these situations firms can focus on exploiting biased consumers who are likely to purchase from them
regardless of price and quality.”); Id. at 8 (describing how consumers’ “cognitive limitations” can
“create[] incentives for firms to present information, for example, about prices, in convoluted ways”).
300. See supra Part II.
301. Day & Stemler, supra note 37, at 8; see also Max Eddy, How Companies Turn Your Data into
Money, PCMAG (Oct. 10, 2018, 2:00 PM) (U.K.), https://uk.pcmag.com/privacy/117876/how-companiesturn-your-data-into-money [https://perma.cc/B9B2-FZD9].
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self-sustaining ‘Attention Cycle,’ designed to increase the amount of
time spent on the platform.”302 Although platforms may initially grab
a user’s attention through benign (or even procompetitive) means like
offering services for free, 303 the ensuing behavioral strategies that
manipulate our bounded willpower and rationality and induce
addiction may be viewed as subtle forms of foreclosure designed to
lock in users and prevent rivals from access. 304 Indeed, platforms are
perfectly poised through their continuous and ubiquitous control over
platform interfaces and platform users to “best stimulate the release of
neurochemicals essential to addiction.”305 Some have described this as
an “upregulat[ing]” of user emotions, resulting in increased
“frequency and intensity of user exposure to emotions,” which in turn
leads to increased engagement—a kind of emotional contagion that in
online contexts becomes amplified. 306
Gamification is one such method. This entails offering prizes to
keep users engaged and induce “compulsive game-playing.”307 A case
in point is Uber, where drivers are told about the number of trips,
money received, and their ratings. 308 The dopamine release can induce
drivers to keep “playing.” 309 Another example is Spotify Wrapped,
which at the end of the year compares users to other users and gives
“top 1%” status awards to top listeners.310 Spotify also motivates users
to compete with themselves with messages like “You listened to 94%
302. Day & Stemler, supra note 37, at 10; see also David S. Evans, Attention Platforms, the Value of
Content, and Public Policy, 54 REV. INDUS. ORG. 775 (2019) (discussing attention platforms).
303. Cf. John M. Newman, The Myth of Free, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 513 (2018) (taking issue with
the word “free” in economics).
304. See Day & Stemler, supra note 37, at 11 (“The issue here is that strategies to [keep and] increase
attention may violate a user’s expectations of privacy, as platforms may . . . manipulate physiological
reactions to create addiction.”).
305. Id. at 12; see also Claudia Dreifus, Why We Can’t Look Away from Our Screens, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/science/technology-addiction-irresistible-by-adam-alter.html
[https://perma.cc/NH72-5F9P] (Mar. 8, 2017).
306. Goldenberg & Gross, supra note 159.
307. Noam Scheiber, How Uber Uses Psychological Tricks to Push Its Drivers’ Buttons, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/04/02/technology/uber-drivers-psychologicaltricks.html [https://perma.cc/9B6W-K5B9].
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Maria Fomina, Triumph Kerins, Katie MacIntosh & Kaylee Somerville, The Behavioral Science
Behind Spotify Wrapped’s Viral Success, DECISION LAB, https://thedecisionlab.com/insights/consumerinsights/the-behavioral-science-behind-spotify-wrappeds-viral-success/ [https://perma.cc/TJ3M-8QWC].
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more minutes than last year–talk about overachieving,” which induces
users to continue using the app in the future. 311 Other platforms use
similar dopamine-oriented methods for keeping users “hooked” and
siloing their attention. 312 For instance, Twitter’s opening blue screen
that looks like it is loading is in fact “building anticipation” for
tweets. 313 Likewise, Instagram’s push notifications tell you when a
Facebook friend has joined Instagram, when a friend’s story has been
uploaded, or if a friend is filming live video. 314 These are Instagram’s
default settings and turning them off will involve much willpower as a
user must search through the maze of Instagram settings. 315 Perhaps
tellingly, some state attorneys general have just recently announced an
investigation into Instagram regarding techniques allegedly used to
increase both the frequency and duration young users spend online.316
Additionally, Facebook’s “Like” feature and “pull-to-refresh” News
Feed can generate cognitive merry-go-rounds similar to a gambling
addiction. 317 More pointedly, neuroscience research, for example,
demonstrates the powerful effect push notifications can have on our
attention, leaving users wanting more. 318 Other addiction-inducing
311. Id.(“[Spotify] Wrapped motivates users to engage with the platform even more in the future, to set
new ‘personal bests.’”).
312. Avery Hartmans, These Are the Sneaky Ways Apps Like Instagram, Facebook, Tinder Lure You in
and Get You ‘Addicted’, INSIDER (Feb. 17, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/how-appdevelopers-keep-us-addicted-to-our-smartphones-2018-1 [https://perma.cc/VS27-JXB8].
313. Day & Stemler, supra note 37, at 12; Hartmans, supra note 312.
314. Hartmans, supra note 312.
315. Id.
316. Cecilia Kang & Mike Isaac, State Attorneys General Open an Inquiry into Instagram’s Impact on
Teens., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/18/technology/meta-instagraminvestigation-teens.html [https://perma.cc/6TTW-R8XQ].
317. Catherine Price, Trapped—The Secret Ways Social Media Is Built to Be Addictive (And What You
Can Do to Fight Back), SCI. FOCUS (Oct. 29, 2018, 8:00 AM) (U.K.),
https://www.sciencefocus.com/future-technology/trapped-the-secret-ways-social-media-is-built-to-beaddictive-and-what-you-can-do-to-fight-back/
[https://perma.cc/KLS2-SS3X]
(“[Social
media
companies] build features into their apps that manipulate our brain chemistry. These tricks are borrowed
straight from casinos and slot machines, which are widely considered to be some of the most addictive
machines ever invented.”).
318. See Mijung Kim, The Effects of External Cues on Media Habit and Use: Push Notification Alerts
and Mobile Application Usage Habits (2014) (Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University),
https://d.lib.msu.edu/etd/3263/datastream/OBJ/View/ [https://perma.cc/G9RE-38V8] (discussing how
push notifications can induce people to use social media more); see also Seul-Kee Kim, So-Yeong Kim
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methods include the recurring ellipses on an iPhone that signal a user
is typing, scrolling newsfeeds that never end, 319 autoplay (Netflix and
YouTube automatically transitioning users to the next video), and
Snapchat’s streak.320
In short, “[b]y facilitating a feedback loop, the release of dopamine
causes users to return to the app more frequently.” 321 One report,
leveraging insights from a former Google product manager and a
co-founder of the company Dopamine Labs, actually attested to
Instagram’s systematic withholding of “Like” notifications so as to
generate more elongated “hits” of dopamine.322 Further, Instagram is
empowered through Big Data analytics to actually tailor reward
schedules to individual users and notify each user at the point the
“algorithms predict the greatest influence on that user’s attention.”323
Structuring platforms in this way—both its architecture and content
release—through subtle use of “dopamine-like” reward systems has in
many ways “tapped into a bottomless font of social
feedback” 324 —with the result being users’ attentions becoming
monopolized (perhaps perpetually so) by a few large digital platform
firms and platform competition becoming cognitively foreclosed. As
one viral blogger commented:
[I]t’s easy to get into a dopamine[-]induced loop. Dopamine

& Hang-Bong Kang, An Analysis of the Effects of Smartphone Push Notifications on Task Performance
with Regard to Smartphone Overuse Using ERP, COMPUTATIONAL INTEL. & NEUROSCIENCE, June 5,
2016, at 1, https://downloads.hindawi.com/journals/cin/2016/5718580.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WYAW5X6] (discussing how push notifications can have a negative effect on performing daily tasks).
319. Nitasha Tiku, The WIRED Guide to Internet Addiction, WIRED (Apr. 18, 2018, 4:00 PM),
https://www.wired.com/story/wired-guide-to-internet-addiction/ [https://perma.cc/6KLP-VRS6].
320. Day & Stemler, supra note 37, at 13.
321. Id. at 12–13.
322. Anderson Cooper, What Is “Brain Hacking”? Tech Insiders on Why You Should Care, CBS NEWS
(Apr. 9, 2017, 7:05 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/brain-hacking-tech-insiders-60-minutes/
[https://perma.cc/PV2N-5YER] (detailing Ramsay Brown—co-founder of Dopamine Labs—description
on how “[t]hey’re holding some of them back for you to let you know later in a big burst. Like, hey, here’s
the 30 likes we didn’t mention from a little while ago.”).
323. Day & Stemler, supra note 37, at 13; see also Cooper, supra note 322.
324. Julian Morgans, Your Addiction to Social Media Is No Accident, VICE (May 17, 2017, 11:09 PM)
(quoting Adam Alter, author of IRRESISTIBLE: THE RISE OF ADDICTIVE TECHNOLOGY AND THE BUSINESS
OF KEEPING US HOOKED (2017)), https://www.vice.com/en/article/vv5jkb/the-secret-ways-social-mediais-built-for-addiction [https://perma.cc/9FJJ-SPWZ].
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starts you seeking, then you get rewarded for the seeking
which makes you seek more. It becomes harder and harder
to stop looking at email, stop texting or stop checking your
phone to see if you have a new notification.
You can see how the scroll wheel was so pinnacle to
Facebook’s success. This too is how social media has
millions hooked.325
Former high-level tech-company employees have also recently
explicitly attested to this culture of trying to achieve addiction-based
usage.326
a. Defaults and Inertia
Intra-platform: We have already seen the amplified power of
defaults in digital markets and their disproportionate impact on
consumer choice vis-à-vis brick-and-mortar markets. 327 Besides the
Google and Microsoft cases discussed above, we are now seeing a
more global influence of defaults on enforcement actions. The U.S.
DOJ and eleven state attorneys general recently initiated a complaint
against Google for abusing its monopoly power in the markets for
online search and search advertising. 328 One component of the
complaint is that Google paid computer and mobile device
manufacturers to be the default search engine on their devices and,
perhaps more malevolently, forbade the pre-installation of competing
search services. 329 As the DOJ argues in its complaint, even when
consumers can change the default, “they rarely do.”330

325. Reece Robertson, Why You’re Addicted to Social Media—Dopamine, Technology, and Inequality,
MEDIUM (Dec. 19, 2017), https://medium.com/@Reece_Robertson/why-youre-addicted-to-social-mediadopamine-technology-inequality-c2cca07ed3ee [https://perma.cc/6GKX-8DXS]; see also Day &
Stemler, supra note 37, at 13–14 (“So by randomizing pleasure in a manner causing the release of
dopamine, a platform can create dependency and, thus, boost the amount of attention spent on it.”
(emphasis added)).
326. Girish, supra note 28.
327. See supra Part II.B.1.
328. Press Release, Off. of Pub. Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 223.
329. Id.
330. Complaint at 3, United States v. Google LLC, No. 20-cv-03010 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 20, 2020).
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The powerfully magnetizing effect of defaults is further reflected in
the huge sums of platforms that are apparently willing to pay to
become the default. For instance, some estimates show that Google
paid Apple somewhere between $8 billion and $12 billion per year just
to be the default search engine on Apple devices. 331 As Cheng asserts:
[Platforms] are willing to pay to become the
default . . . suggests there is considerable value to becoming
the default provider. Firms recognize that in the same way
users may not necessarily choose the most relevant links on
a results webpage, users may not immediately switch to the
search engine that most suits their preferences. 332
Besides platforms coercing or buying their way into “default
monopolies,” a potent context in which defaults may be implemented
particularly perniciously is a platform that is a vertically-integrated
marketplace with private-label brands within that marketplace. Such a
platform can exhibit self-preferencing and own-content bias by setting
its own products and content as the default at the expense of rivals. For
example, a third-party seller of “Pillow Pets” (stuffed animals
resembling NFL football mascots) soon had to contend with Amazon
selling a private-label version. 333 Amazon afforded preferential
treatment to its own pillow pets by giving them featured placement on
its website. 334 Subsequently, sales of the third-party’s pillow pets
dropped from 100 per day to 20 per day. 335 Another example is
Amazon’s apparent efforts to restrict rival access to sponsored ad
placement and favor its own products in this respect. 336 Some rivals
331. Chris Smith, Search on iPhone Costs Google $8–12 Billion a Year, BGR (Oct. 26, 2020, 7:31
AM),
https://bgr.com/2020/10/26/google-apple-iphone-search-deal-doj-antitrust-case/
[https://perma.cc/CZ7L-BH2R]; INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS, supra note 26,
at 345.
332. Cheng, supra note 96, at 28.
333. Greg
Bensinger,
Competing
with
Amazon
on
Amazon,
WALL
ST.
J.,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304441404577482902055882264
[https://perma.cc/LSS3-C5R3] (June 27, 2012, 6:15 PM).
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS, supra note 26, at 285.
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were apparently disallowed from purchasing “Amazon.com search
advertising—ads that present products at the top of the search results
when consumers enter specific search terms or a product name.” 337
Indeed, one competitor of voice-enabled devices vividly captured the
foreclosure concerns one might have with such conduct by pointing to
the confusion and deception this may instil in consumers who are met
with “ads promoting Amazon products even when they specifically
search for a competitor’s product on Amazon.com.” 338 These
examples thus serve to illustrate how a platform may take advantage
of default effects and cognitively foreclose competition at the
intra-platform level.
b. Dark Patterns
Dark patterns offer another potentially pernicious method for
technology platforms to exploit consumer biases and induce them into
decisions that they otherwise would not have made under conditions
of perfect rationality. 339 For example, Apple’s iOS 6 included an
Identifier for Advertisers (IDFA) where each devices’ “unique
identifier” was used to “track browsing activity,” which we now know
is valuable to advertisers who can utilize these data sets to be more
nimble and tailored in their advertising efforts. 340 Disabling this
feature, however, is a classic example of how “System 1” thinking can
be hijacked to induce users into suboptimal decisions.341 The disable
setting was not located in “Privacy” settings (as one might intuitively
think) but rather was located under “General,” then the sub-setting
337. Id. (emphasis added).
338. Id. (emphasis added).
339. Harry Brignull, Dark Patterns: Inside the Interfaces Designed to Trick You, VERGE (Aug. 29,
2013, 11:15 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2013/8/29/4640308/dark-patterns-inside-the-interfacesdesigned-to-trick-you [https://perma.cc/M9BS-AKWJ] (describing dark patterns as user interfaces
“carefully crafted to trick users into doing things they might not otherwise do” and how dark patterns are
“carefully crafted with a solid understanding of human psychology”); see also Ram Sagar, Opinion,
Confirm-Shaming, Privacy Zuckering & Sneak Adding: E-Tailers Are Using These Dark Patterns to Make
You Buy Junk, ANALYTICS INDIA MAG. (Oct. 16, 2019), https://analyticsindiamag.com/confirm-shamingprivacy-zuckering-sneak-adding-e-tailers-dark-patterns-machine-learning/
[https://perma.cc/DNU8XJ3D] (“Dark [p]atterns are tricks used in websites and apps that make you do things that you didn’t mean
to, like buying or signing up for something.”).
340. Brignull, supra note 339.
341. KAHNEMAN, supra note 152, at 21 (describing “System 1” decisions that require little effort).
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labeled “About,” and then a further sub-setting labeled
“Advertising.”342 Even when one reached the setting, the wording was
“framed”343 in a manner that again sought to take advantage of users’
cognitive shortcomings, or in other words, “Limit Ad
Tracking—Off.”344 This is a double negative that may lead users to
believe ad-tracking is “off” when in fact it is “on.” 345 That dark
patterns take advantage of cognitive biases is being increasingly
recognized. 346 Princeton Postdoctoral Research Fellow Arunesh
Mathur and others, for instance, “draw an explicit connection between
each type of dark pattern . . . and the cognitive bias it exploits.” 347
Sneaking extra purchases into an online shopping basket, for example,
can take advantage of consumers’ bias towards default options—“with
the website behind it hoping that users will stick with the products it
adds to cart.” 348 The sunk cost fallacy is also a prime target for
manipulation: by revealing extra fees and charges only at the end of
the purchase process, “users are likely to feel so invested in the process
that they justify the additional charges by completing the purchase to
not waste their effort.” 349 Further, a more nuanced form of
perniciously inducing a consumer decision is “[c]onfirmshaming” by
taking advantage of our bounded self-interest and framing options in
ways that “shame” the user into the framer’s desired choice. 350
Particularly demonstrative is Amazon trying to steer customers
towards Kindle editions of books (which is an Amazon product) by
framing the rejection of the Kindle edition as, “No, [t]hanks. I don’t
want to save £10.30.”351
342. Brignull, supra note 339.
343. For an overview of the “framing” effect, see Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 14, at 1104–07. See
also Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 244.
344. Brignull, supra note 339.
345. Id.
346. Arunesh Mathur, Gunes Acar, Michael J. Friedman, Elena Lucherini, Jonathan Mayer, Marshini
Chetty & Arvind Narayanan, Dark Patterns at Scale: Findings from a Crawl of 11K Shopping Websites,
3 PROC. ACM ON HUM.-COMPUT. INTERACTION, no. 81, 2019, at 1, 6 (“Many types of dark patterns
operate by exploiting cognitive biases in users.”).
347. Id.
348. Id. at 13.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 16.
351. Sagar, supra note 339.
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Such insidious methods of inducing purchases are very much
nascent phenomena in antitrust circles but, nonetheless, their capacity
to frustrate switching, deplete consumer decision-making abilities and,
therefore, generate foreclosure is starting to be recognized. Day and
Stemler, for instance, argue that such manipulation can be so powerful
that it essentially crosses the line from persuasion to coercion. 352
Consequently, it may generate antitrust scrutiny. As the authors
conclude: “[C]oncentrated markets in which firms design interfaces to
addict, subtly influence, or manipulate users are qualitatively inferior
than those preserving free will.” 353 In this sense, manipulation of
cognitive vulnerabilities may generate antitrust scrutiny where it
“force[s] [the] purchaser to do something that he would not do in a
competitive market.” 354 Others have very recently made similar
acknowledgments towards dark patterns’ capacities for generating
“cognitive market failures” by pushing consumers “to do things they
might not otherwise do.”355
c. Summary
This Section has highlighted a myriad of ways digital platform firms
could take (and have taken) advantage of consumers’ cognitive
anomalies that frustrate switching incentives and abilities to maintain,
strengthen, and solidify market power. Through a concoction of
methods, digital platforms have powerful capacities to dilute the
disciplining effect of the market mechanism through rational consumer
choice.
Of particular note are the methods generating addiction. From the
perspective of BE, one might say that digital platforms have geared
themselves towards reversing the traditional rational choice
conception of behavior—that the relationship between past and present
behavior is negative and, therefore, as consumption increases, utility
352. Day & Stemler, supra note 37, at 31–34.
353. Id. at 37 (emphasis added).
354. Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Tucker v. Apple Comput., Inc., 493 F. Supp. 2d 1090,
1097 (N.D. Cal. 2006)).
355. Jamie Luguri & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Shining a Light on Dark Patterns, 13 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS
43, 103 (2021).
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gradually decreases. 356 Platforms, however, seem to exhibit the
reverse relationship: “by making platforms addictive, platforms can
boost the time spent on their interfaces, thereby increasing surveillance
and amounts of data collected.”357 More data mean greater abilities to
optimize experiences and dopamine releases so that users find
themselves in a perpetual “[a]ttention [c]ycle” 358 that may be
viscerally difficult to break out of.
IV. BEHAVIORAL MARKET POWER—A “SUBSTANTIAL” AND
“SUSTAINABLE” DEVIATION FROM PERFECTION IN DIGITAL PLATFORM
MARKETS?
Thus far, this Article has extended the conversation about BE’s
implications for anticompetitive conduct by providing a more
comprehensive and systematic exposition of cognitive foreclosure
methods and illustrating the particular seriousness of such methods in
digital platform contexts. We now turn to examine the implications for
market power.359
Although consumers may only be subjected to manipulative
conduct because they suffer from cognitive anomalies, this
simultaneously means they may negate the potential need for antitrust
intervention if they can surmount their behavioral shortcomings
themselves. In other words, consumers are both the source of and (may
be) the potential antidote to behaviorally manipulative conduct that
seeks to solidify market power. The demand-side is therefore the
source of behavioral market failure. Yet when dealing with
demand-side market failures, one should be cautious for at least two
reasons about such market failures’ capacities for justifiably triggering
antitrust scrutiny.

356. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 14, at 1114.
357. Day & Stemler, supra note 37, at 16.
358. Id. at 10.
359. We noted at the outset that academic commentary, as it relates to conduct, has been limited and
that the omission is even more identifiable as it relates to market power. See supra note 21 and
accompanying text.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol38/iss4/9

70

O'Loughlin: Cognitive Foreclosure

2022]

COGNITIVE FORECLOSURE

1167

First, anxieties about the market power concept expanding too
broadly for antitrust enforcement purposes have usually been triggered
whenever the demand-side has been in issue,360 which should therefore
provide us with some motivation for assessing whether BE—a
demand-side deviation from perfect competition—is sufficiently
indented from perfection to raise antitrust issues. Second, a related
reason motivating an understanding of the limits of BE for antitrust
enforcement is that BE has sometimes been conceived of as giving rise
to potential consumer protection (not antitrust) problems 361—the area

360. Kodak is a case in point. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
Several commentators took issue with Kodak—the crux of which concerned consumers’ capacities to
exercise their competitive constraints—because they viewed it as a case concerning a kind of market
power that did not deserve to come within the circumference of antitrust market power. See, e.g., Arthur,
supra note 21, at 6 (“The market power which results from . . . non[-]structural, market imperfections,
such as those identified in Kodak, is fundamentally different in both degree and kind, and thus not
sufficiently substantial to justify antitrust regulation.” (emphasis added)); Benjamin Klein, Market Power
in Antitrust: Economic Analysis After Kodak, 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 87 (1993) (“Asking transactors
what they thought their contract terms meant and what risks they believed they assumed seems clearly to
be a question for contract law rather than for antitrust.”). Another scholar characterized Kodak in the
following way:
Kodak is arguably the most important antitrust decision of the past twenty years.
Unfortunately, it is a disaster. By changing the traditional approach to market
power analysis and discarding the market share proxy in cases involving markets
with significant information gaps, the Supreme Court has effectively decided that
every firm may possess market power, regardless of its market share.
Michael S. Jacobs, Market Power Through Imperfect Information: The Staggering Implications of
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services and a Modest Proposal for Limiting Them, 52 MD. L.
REV. 336, 373 (1993) (emphasis added). Another demand-side imperfection contributing to scholarly
anxiety about antitrust market power expanding too broadly has been consumers’ lack of omniscience.
These kinds of market imperfections, scholars contend, are matters for contract law (not antitrust) and
thus should be outside the bounds of what might constitute antitrust market power. Klein, supra, at 90
(“[I]t is important to remember that the perfectly competitive model is merely an abstract economic
construct, not a criterion for governmental intervention in the marketplace. In particular, it makes no sense
to assume that any deviations from the unrealistic assumptions of the perfectly competitive model
represent ‘imperfections’ that should be eliminated as a way to increase competition and reduce market
power.” (emphasis added)); Hovenkamp, supra note 16, at 306 (discussing franchisor-franchisee
relationships and arguing that “[t]he wrong, if there is one, lies in the franchisees’ failure to study contracts
carefully before they enter into them, or perhaps in the franchisor’s improper use of form franchise
agreements that take advantage of less experienced business persons. . . . [I]n that case any remedy should
lie in contract law, not in the law of monopolies.” (emphasis added)); cf. Mark R. Patterson, Coercion,
Deception, and Other Demand-Increasing Practices in Antitrust Law, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 5–6 (1997)
(arguing how certain demand-side market failures can sometimes be antitrust issues).
361. Huffman, supra note 30, at 14 (“Behavioural economics has a natural place in consumer protection
regulation.”); Joshua D. Wright, The Antitrust/Consumer Protection Paradox: Two Policies at War with
Each Other, 121 YALE L.J. 2216, 2259 (2012) (arguing that BE has infiltrated consumer protection law
whilst antitrust law still relies on a rational choice theory paradigm).
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of law that regulates market failures more de minimis in nature.362 Or,
at the very least, the former rather than the latter offers a more
appropriate remedy for behavioral market failures in the form of
mandated disclosure requirements, for instance. 363 Additionally,
Averitt and Lande demarcate the consumer protection boundary from
the antitrust boundary by labeling the former as encompassing issues
residing “inside the consumer’s head” (where, of course, BE anomalies
originate) and the latter as those stemming from market failures
“external to consumers.”364
The behavioral biases that consumers suffer from—a demand-side
market failure—will only be of concern to antitrust rather than
consumer protection if they can satisfy two criteria. The deviation must
first constitute a “substantial” (a non-de minimis) deviation from
perfection—that is, it must afford firms the power to significantly

362. See Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Antitrust and
Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 713, 728 (1997); Huffman, supra note 30, at 9 (“The
failures with which consumer law is concerned undermine the consumer’s ability to optimize his or her
own welfare.” (emphasis added)); 3B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW:
AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 782b, at 351 (4th ed. 2015) (“[T]he
courts would be wise to regard misrepresentation as presumptively de minimis for § 2 purposes.”);
HOVENKAMP, supra note 233, § 7.13, at 439 (“[M]ost business torts have only a de minimis effect or no
effect at all on competition.”). Posner has also acknowledged that these kinds of market failures are
sufficiently dealt with by other areas of law. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 31, at 195 (describing
how fraudulent attainment of a patent or falsely disparaging rivals’ products are “adequately punished
under other laws”). Courts have also exhibited skepticism about demand-side market failures to generate
the kind of market power antitrust should concern itself with. See, e.g., Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2
v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 27 (1984) (stating how consumer information failures “may generate ‘market power’
in some abstract sense, [but] they do not generate the kind of market power that justifies condemnation of
tying” (footnote omitted)), superseded by statute on other grounds, Act of Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-703, 102 Stat. 4674, as recognized in Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006), and
abrogated by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
363. Oren Bar-Gill, Competition and Consumer Protection: A Behavioral Economics Account, in THE
PROS AND CONS OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 12, 33 (Swedish Competition Auth. ed., 2012),
https://www.konkurrensverket.se/globalassets/dokument/informationsmaterial/rapporter-ochbroschyrer/pros-and-cons/rapport_pros-and-cons_2012_consumer_protection.pdf
[https://perma.cc/97TC-9SBY] (proffering mandated disclosure as an appropriate remedy because it is
usually the “least intrusive form of regulation” and also because it “directly target[s] the mistakes and
misperceptions at the core of the behavioral market failure”).
364. Averitt & Lande, supra note 362, at 714 (describing how consumer protection is intended to deal
with market failures “inside the consumer’s head”).
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damage the entire market.365 The deviation must also be “sustainable”:
the need for antitrust intervention might be reduced if consumers
themselves can overcome their behavioral shortcomings and impose
their demand-side self-correcting constraints when appropriate. 366
Indeed, all firms possess some market power, 367 and extending
antitrust enforcement to all firms would result in an unjustifiably wide
enforcement scope. Thus, the scope of intervention needs to be
restricted only to substantial and sustainable deviations from perfect
competition.
The ensuing analysis presents a special focus on digital platform
markets and proffers these as environments where behavioral market
failures in the form of cognitive foreclosure arguably deserve to be
taken seriously. Consequently, they are one context, contrary to some
views, in which a demand-side market failure may have a more
justifiable role to play in antitrust enforcement policy. As Lande notes
365. Colangelo & Maggiolino, supra note 30, at 70. Scholars contend that it is a firm’s capacity to
control market conditions—that is, aggregate demand—rather than its own price that justifies a charge of
“monopoly power.” Id.; Klein, supra note 360, at 76 (“Instead of using the perfectly competitive model
to define the degree of antitrust market power possessed by a firm in terms of the effects of changes in the
firm’s prices on the demand for the firm’s services, i.e., in terms of the firm’s own elasticity of demand,
it is more useful to define the extent of a firm’s antitrust market power in terms of whether changes in the
firm’s prices have any significant effect on market quantities and prices.” (emphasis omitted)). Arthur,
for example, maintains that it is structural market power that antitrust should concern itself with and
defines this as a “uniform” form of market power that affects “all buyers alike” where “[e]ach must pay
the seller’s price or do without the good . . . .” Arthur, supra note 21, at 37 (emphasis added); see, e.g.,
Carrier & Tushnet, supra note 30, at 1870–76 (arguing how deception, a demand-side market failure, in
the form of false advertising by a monopolist can damage the market as a whole).
366. Short-run market power is of no antitrust concern if the long-run can arrive relatively quickly and
penetrate the firm’s customer base. An ability to protect “excess profits from erosion,” therefore, is what
really constitutes antitrust market power because here the long-run will be slow to arrive and damage to
the market will persist. Arthur, supra note 21, at 28; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust,
63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 11 (1984) (arguing how the purpose of antitrust is to “speed up the arrival of the long
run (so that firms lose market power faster)”).
367. Gregory J. Werden, Demand Elasticities in Antitrust Analysis, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 363, 371 (1998)
(“[T]he vast majority of firms have at least a little market power. In particular, every seller of a product
that is differentiated with respect to any relevant dimension almost certainly has some market power.”
(emphasis added)); George A. Hay, Market Power in Antitrust, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 807, 812–14 (1992)
(comparing various definitions of market power and concluding that they are “not very useful for antitrust
purposes” because defining market power as “the ability to raise price” above competitive levels will
apply to “any firm facing a downward sloping demand curve, no matter how slight the slope (i.e., no
matter how elastic the demand curve)”); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in
Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 939 (1981) (“Under perfect competition, price equals marginal
cost, so if a firm’s price is above its marginal cost, the implication is that the firm does not face perfect
competition, i.e., that it has at least some market power.”).
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in calling for a more inclusive antitrust approach to these kinds of
market failures (ones that have “usually [been] associated with
consumer protection violations”), 368 the question is “the extent [to
which] they exist significantly” such that they “should [instead] affect
antitrust decision[-]making.”369
A. Illustrations of “Substantial” Behavioral Market Power in
Digital Platform Markets
Both Google Search (Shopping) and Google Android demonstrate
the magnitude of demand-side deviations from perfection in digital
platform markets, where empirical studies showed that BE deviations
did have the capacity to generate “substantial” market power.
In the Commission’s decision of Google Search (Shopping), for
instance, which has recently been upheld by the EU General Court, 370
the Commission found that the highest search rankings “generate
significant traffic” to those search results.371 Specifically, users usually
look at the first three to five search result rankings on page one and
“pay little or no attention to the remaining results.” 372 Starkly, the
studies the Commission relied on show that the first three links account
for 40%–65% of total clicks on desktops, and on mobile devices, this
effect is increased with the top three links assuming more than 70% of
total clicks.373 Overall, the ten highest results receive 95% of all clicks
and the highest result is clicked on more than any other.374 As one of

368. Robert H. Lande, Market Power Without a Large Market Share: The Role of Imperfect Information
and Other “Consumer Protection” Market Failures 1 (Am. Antitrust Inst., AAI Working Paper No.
07-06, 2007), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1103613 [https://perma.cc/4SN64HV9].
369. Id. at 13 (arguing that sometimes these market failures can generate market power similar to
“market share-based market power”); see also Stucke, supra note 30, at 1094 (“The critical issue is
whether the misrepresentation reasonably appears capable of making a significant contribution to
maintaining or attaining monopoly power . . . .”).
370. Case T-612/17 Google LLC & Alphabet, Inc. v. Comm’n (Google Shopping),
ECLI:EU:T:2021:763, ¶ 596 (Nov. 10, 2021), appeal filed, Case C-48/22 P (Jan. 20, 2022).
371. Google Search (Shopping), supra note 110, ¶ 453.
372. Id. ¶ 455.
373. Id. ¶ 455 n.541.
374. Id. ¶ 457.
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the studies concludes, “consumers seem to display an inherent bias”
towards higher ranked search results. 375
In Google Android, 376 a similarly “substantial” deviation from
perfection was displayed. Explained through the lens of the status quo
bias, the Commission demonstrated its power to foreclose competition
and generate market power with illuminating data. 377 For example,
between 2014 and 2017 in the largest EU states, search queries on
Google Search accounted only for 10%–20% to 40%–50% on devices
where Google Search was not pre-installed; when Google Search was
pre-installed, it accounted for 90%–100%. 378 Further illustrating the
power of the status quo bias, search queries were almost non-existent,
switching from Google Search to rival search applications. 379
Specifically, on devices worldwide on which Google Search was the
default app, rivals’ apps were downloaded on only 0%–5% of those
devices between 2011 and 2016. 380
B. The Potential “Sustainability” of Cognitive Foreclosure in
Digital Platform Markets
Market power needs to be “durable” in addition to being
“substantial” to generate the kind of market power that antitrust ought
to concern itself with. If consumers can learn from their mistakes and
become more perfect in their rationality and willpower, then there is
hope for the market to correct itself and obviate the need for
intervention. This Section, however, shows some pessimism for these
capacities in the online world.
A final consideration is whether BE’s “substantial” deviation from
perfection can be rendered transient (countervailed by consumer
learning). Through experience, consumers may be able to overcome
their cognitive shortcomings and increase the “quality” of their

375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
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decision-making. 381 This would push the demand-side’s market
disciplining effect closer towards perfection. Studies show that
learning is curtailed unless feedback is “careful, frequent, and
quick.” 382 Some environments are conducive to such preconditions
while others are not. For example, weather forecasters may
competently calibrate their decision-making over time as they
repeatedly report the weather,383 while members of a jury in a criminal
trial possess “little opportunity to learn from mistakes.”384
Although other markets and phenomena, like utilities markets and
brands, have demonstrated “substantial” behavioral market power,385
381. Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal
Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1521 (1998) (“There is a substantial debate in
the literature . . . as to whether facing repeated decision tasks will provide the kind of feedback that
gradually improves the quality of the decision making.”).
382. Colin F. Camerer, Comment on Noll and Krier, “Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for
Risk Regulation,” 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 791, 794 (1990).
383. Id.
384. Langevoort, supra note 381.
385. Notorious for sticky consumers are utility markets. In the market for electricity, for example,
Wilson and Price reveal findings that would tend to demonstrate “substantial” market power on the part
of electricity suppliers. See Chris M. Wilson & Catherine Waddams Price, Irrationality in Consumers’
Switching Decisions: When More Firms May Mean Less Benefit (ESRC Ctr. for Competition Pol’y, CCP
Working
Paper
No.
05-04,
2005)
(U.K.),
https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econwp/io/papers/0509/0509010.pdf [https://perma.cc/TX44-MXKX]. They also posit that the source of this
market power—consumer switching errors—is consumer irrationality. Id. at 2–3. Bar-Gill and Stone
arrive at similar conclusions in the market for mobile phone plans. See Oren Bar-Gill & Rebecca Stone,
Mobile Misperceptions, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49 (2009). Moreover, the consumer decision-making
mistakes are, again, a product of irrationality or as the authors put it, a market response to consumers’
“imperfect rationality.” Id. at 52. The magnitude of the mistakes demonstrates the potential for BE failures
to generate “substantial” market power. See id. at 85, 98. A more persuasive example of BE failures
potentially generating “substantial” market power may be the UK Competition and Market Authorities’
(CMA) Energy Market Investigation. COMPETITION & MKTS. AUTH., ENERGY MARKET INVESTIGATION:
FINAL
REPORT
(June
24,
2016)
(U.K.),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5773de34e5274a0da3000113/final-report-energy-marketinvestigation.pdf [https://perma.cc/HU7U-G74Q]. Major reasons identified for this disengagement can be
characterized as consumer inertia and bounded rationality. Id. at 485. Brands have also been shown to
demonstrate significant market power. Brand name drugs, for example, can sometimes command much
higher prices than generics despite the two products being functionally interchangeable. In the market for
painkillers, for example, generic equivalents to Advil and Tylenol may sell as much as 50% lower than
the latter. See Simon P. Anderson, Federico Ciliberto, Jura Liaukonyte & Régis Renault, Push-Me
Pull-You: Comparative Advertising in the OTC Analgesics Industry, 47 RAND J. ECON. 1029, 1038 tbl.1
(2016). Other examples outside the pharmaceutical context further highlight the capacity of brands to
generate significant market power. Big brand gasoline names like Shell and Chevron, for instance, are
ranked consistently in the top five fuel products for pricing power. Report: Chevron Leads Fuel Brands
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it may be argued that these markets differ significantly in their capacity
for “sustaining” such market failures vis-à-vis digital platform
markets. This is because of digital platform markets’ idiosyncratic
characteristics. In light of what we now know about digital markets
and platforms’ powerful capacities to manipulate users, there is an
argument that digital platform markets are environments that are
peculiarly hostile, rather than conducive, to learning. Users’
manipulation susceptibility and platforms’ manipulation abilities and
incentives could constitute unique and powerful obstacles in this
respect.386
As to manipulation susceptibility, we have already seen the
amplification of biases in the online world. It would therefore seem
naïve to expect consumers to overcome their cognitive shortcomings
in digital environments, particularly because the evidence on learning
effects is generally mixed at best. 387 Some studies suggest that as
human beings we are terrible at calibrating over time. 388 Regarding
manipulation abilities and incentives, platforms’ continuous and
ubiquitous control over users, coupled with unparalleled sophistication
from Big Data—an element not present in other markets but specific
to digital platform markets—would also seem to cut against a belief in
the capacity of consumers to correct their BE failures over time.
Indeed, if digital platforms possess amplified incentives to retain our

in Pricing Power, CONVENIENCE STORE NEWS (July 12, 2018), https://csnews.com/report-chevron-leadsfuel-brands-pricing-power [https://perma.cc/7BQW-ETSX]. One study demonstrated differences in per
gallon prices of 18.2 cents between gas stations and reasoned that brand allegiance drove the difference.
Jennifer R. Thompson, Brand Loyalty and Gasoline Pricing in Sacramento, AGRIC. & RES. ECON.
UPDATE, July/Aug. 2007, at 9, 9. Haagen-Dazs’ ability to enter the ice-cream market at a price 30% to
40% higher than its closest substitute may be attributed to its branding efforts in portraying images of
affluence and sophistication. Erich Joachimsthaler & David A. Aaker, Building Brands Without Mass
Media, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 1997, at 39, 41. Survey evidence reveals that a substantial amount of
consumers are willing to pay premiums just for branded products despite the existence of functionally
interchangeable substitutes. Seventy-two percent will pay a 20% premium above the price of the closest
substitute rival; 50% will pay a 25% premium; 40% will pay a 30% premium; and 25% say “price does
not matter” when it comes to purchasing brands that they are loyal to. SCOTT M. DAVIS, BRAND ASSET
MANAGEMENT: DRIVING PROFITABLE GROWTH THROUGH YOUR BRANDS 5 (2002).
386. See supra Part II.
387. Berndt Brehmer, In One Word: Not from Experience, 45 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 223, 224 (1980)
(“[A] “solid body of evidence [shows] that people do not always learn from experience . . . .” (emphasis
added)).
388. See generally id. at 223–40.

Published by Reading Room, 2022

77

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 4 [2022], Art. 9

1174

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:4

attention and leave us perpetually locked into an addictive, dream-like
state, then the platform’s only incentive would be to induce us into an
even deeper sleep—especially when faced with the prospect of
consumer learning. In particular, digital platforms are uniquely
positioned to “sludge” the rivalrous process by rendering at will the
consumer learning and switching process more difficult,389 simply by
altering the choice architecture and content release in ways that can
take advantage of each individual user’s cognitive limitations and
specific behavioral data. For these reasons, one might view digital
platform markets as environments with significantly enhanced
capacities for sustaining substantial behavioral market failures.
CONCLUSION
In examining the BE implications for antitrust’s two most
fundamental doctrinal concepts—conduct and market power—this
Article has extended previous Behavioral Antitrust literature by
elucidating how the fusion of two emerging phenomena, digital
platform technology and BE, is moving us closer towards an antitrust
world of cognitive foreclosure—a form of foreclosure that is
pernicious but powerful. In particular, it is shown how such
phenomena may cut against both the immediacy and intensity of the
substitution effect 390 in a way that may be “substantial” and
“sustainable.” It has therefore provided a context in which a
demand-side market failure, usually regulated by consumer protection
regimes and traditionally contested as genuine antitrust issues, may
justifiably come within the remit of antitrust enforcement.

389. Cass R. Sunstein, Sludge and Ordeals, 68 DUKE L.J. 1843, 1850 (2019) (“[Sludge] should be taken
to refer to the kind of friction, large or small, that people face when they want to go in one or another
direction. For their own reasons, whether self-interested or altruistic, private and public institutions might
impose or increase sludge.” (footnote omitted)); see also Richard H. Thaler, Editorial, Nudge, Not Sludge,
361 SCIENCE 431, 431 (2018) (describing sludge).
390. See Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 13, at 1026; Heinemann, supra note 15, at 231 (arguing that BE
“eliminates the fiction of perfect rationality”).
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